Transitions in Nationalism: The Process ofDemocratization in YugoslaviaThe Yugoslav transition to democracyis perhaps the most complex of all of the Eastern European cases. The level ofparallel mobilization of ordinary people in Yugoslavia, namely of industrialworkers and Kosovo Serbs, various groups during the antibureaucratic revolutionand Kosovo Albanians, surpassed those in most other East European states, ifjudged by the numbers of participants, the variety of groups involved and thetemporal and geographical extension of mobilization.[1] Rangingfrom small and orderly events to large and highly disruptive protest marchesand demonstrations, popular protests led to considerable changes in thecomposition of policies of Yugoslavia’s political elites, and more importantly,in the structure of its authoritarian regime.[2]However, this narrative of mobilization that tends to dominate publishedaccounts sharply contrast with those of the people associated with politicalstruggles in other Eastern European states and the dark forces of nationalismin the region.In Yugoslavia, nationalism, which did not correspond perfectly to the various republics, dominated all other issues, including democratization. Unlike some of the other federal states in Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (USSR), Valerie Bruce has pointed out that Yugoslavia lacked a strong central bureaucracy, consisting in the final diagnosis of little more than the Yugoslavia National Army (JNA). While officially a federation, Bunce goes as far as to call Yugoslavia a “confederation” because unlike the Czechoslovak and Soviet “actual” federations, which were “characterized by the existence of shared power based on territorial-administrative divisions,” Yugoslavia was defined by the “domination of the republics over the center.”[3] Despite his best efforts, Josip Broz Tito, the first President of Yugoslavia, had only been able to unite the six republics by offering each state significant degrees of autonomy in a highly decentralized federal government. For example, each republic was, following the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, allowed its own territorial defense force, and the Yugoslav market, including its banking system, was segmented along republican lines.[4] Furthermore, it can be argued that Tito’s break with Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), head of the Soviet state, in 1948 absolved republican leaders of the intense presence of Moscow, and that regional politicians therefore felt less bound to the policies of the central government, especially after the death of President Tito in 1980. Some of Yugoslavia’s constituentrepublics were historically opposed, most notably the Catholic Croats and theOrthodox Serbs. For example, during the Second World War, the Utasha, theCroatian fascists, fought alongside the Axis powers, and more importantly,against the Serbian Chetniks. Following the war, President Tito’s solution tothe long-lasting animosities was to prohibit any discussion regarding thetopic. While initially, Tito’s solution created a sense of unity under theguise of socialism, ingrained nationalist grievances exploded among therepublics as communism in the East fell. As a result of the fall of the SovietUnion, and as a consequence communism, ideas of democratization became less andless of a priority. Thus, in order to properly lead an effort ofdemocratization, Yugoslavia’s historical record had to be resolved, in whicheach republic utilized different ideas in order to do.[5]Periodization The periodization of the Yugoslavdemocratization process is a complex matter for several reasons. First, andmost obviously, the period of liberalization of the Soviet Union and itssatellite communist states during the 1980s could not contain the Yugoslavstate and its successor states. States that followed a path of democratizationsimilar to Hungary included only Slovenia. Other states, like Croatia andSerbia, respectively, took longer to complete their journey to democratizationas Western-funded opposition groups imposed their will on the process. However,in 2000, Croatia left authoritarianism through an organized election whileSerbia experienced the first “color revolution,” where hundreds of thousandsengaged in protests against Slobodan Milosevic’s effort to capture thepresidency. Lastly, the remaining republics of Macedonia, Bosnia, andHerzegovina fell victim to deep ethnic divisions, in addition to laggingeconomic development, resulting in a much slower path to democracy. By 2007,all of the former Yugoslav state, with the exceptions of Bosnia andHerzegovina, had democratized.[6] Second, as a country, Yugoslavia operated in vast difference to its Eastern European and communist neighbors. By the mid-1980s, the country closely resembled Hungary as communist elites in the various republics lost faith in communism, and, as a result, instituted policies creating considerable freedom for its citizen to voice their concerns with the direction of the state. Because of this lack of authoritarianism in Yugoslavia, it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly the shift to democratization began. Nonetheless, it is considerably safe to mark the establishment of the 1974 Constitution, which further decentralized Yugoslavia, beginning the process of fragmentation among its republics, or the death of President Tito in 1980 as the beginning of the path to democratization.To further emphasize the complex nature of the Yugoslav transition to democracy, Susan L. Woodward points out that “on the eve of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe, Yugoslavia was better poised than any socialist country to make a successful transition to a market economy and the West.”[7] However, considering this point, Yugoslavia still took longer to complete the democratization process and was the only country in Eastern Europe to undergo a civil war.  As Gale Stokes points out, Yugoslaviahad neither a velvet revolution nor a velvet divorce. Midway through 1991 twoof its six constituent republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared theirindependence, provoking a vicious civil war that spread in 1992 to Bosnia andHerzegovina. Ethnic emotions run deep throughout Eastern Europe, but nowheredid they reach the level of bestiality as they did in Yugoslavia…What happened?How did Yugoslavia, the first Communist state to break with the Soviet Unionand the most open Communist state in the world in the 1960s, come to thisdepressing impasse?[8]To answer the question posed by Stokes is that unlikeother Eastern European states, democratization became secondary to otherconcerns, most notably extremism defined in nationalistic terms. Althoughnationalism acted as a factor in other Eastern European transitions, such asthose of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, but nowhere elsedid it create the devastating implications that it did in Yugoslavia.Therefore, ironically then, Yugoslavia’s considerably advantageous startingpoint in the process of democratization became a great disadvantage, as theleaders of its republics sought to maintain their positions of power byexploiting nationalist concerns and rhetoric that had been living underneathsurface of Yugoslav society. Structural ConditionsThe structural conditions that surrounded and enabled Yugoslavia’s transition are rather complex. In order to properly understand the context in which the country dissolved in the early 1990s and fell victim to severe ethnic conflicts, it is essential to acquire a familiar grounding in the history of Yugoslavia. Unlike most of the other Eastern European countries that emerged following the Second World War, the establishment of Yugoslav as a communist state came not as a result of Soviet intervention. Rather, its creation became the logical outcome of the massively armed struggle waged by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) during the Second World War against the regional fascist forces that supported the Axis powers. The communists, led by Josip Broz Tito, asserted control over the then-known Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and by 1945, succeeded in eliminating the existing multi-party system.[9] In January 1946, the country introduced a new constitution under its new name – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Composed of six republics and two autonomous provinces, the new territorial entity instituted significant freedoms to its various republics, creating a decentralized governmental system that would only increase following the adoption of the 1974 Constitution.[10] Although Yugoslavia initially aligned with Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, the relationship between the two Communist states collapsed as early as 1948 after Moscow repeatedly accused Tito of not being strong enough in his support of the Soviet Union. This conflict resulted from Stalin’s paranoia of Tito establishing a Balkan version of the Soviet Union that, instead of acting in accordance with the USSR, would rival the communist center of Eastern Europe. However, as a result of an agreement between Winston Churchill and Stalin during the Yalta Conference, Yugoslavia did not face the level of punishment that other dissident states like Czechoslovakia incurred. For the Soviet Union, invading Yugoslavia in order to preserve its adherence to Moscow would come at a much higher price than other Soviet-led invasions of Eastern Europe.[11]As a result of Yugoslavia’s considerably strained relationship with the Soviet Union, the United States and European governments began to provide Yugoslavia with economic aid in the late 1940s, resulting in a prosperous Yugoslavia in the 1950s and the 1960s. The aspiration of the Yugoslav government was to establish its own brand of a socialist economic system that incorporated various aspects and principles of the capitalist market system. For example, private business could be established; however, such businesses were limited to only four employees. Thus, the state operated all of the major businesses, however, in a much more decentralized manner than its neighboring countries. The establishment of this “self-management” system meant that Yugoslav workers maintained control of their factories and workplaces. Although this system benefitted the country greatly, with the Yugoslav economy growing quickly and maintaining low levels of unemployment, inefficient use of foreign aid caused its economic growth rate to halt significantly in the 1970s.The subsequent economic downturn was exacerbated by the global economic crisis of the time, and as the second oil crisis hit the world in 1979, the “Yugoslav miracle” was officially over. The reason the economic crisis hit the country only in the late 1970s was because like its neighboring nations and nations in Latin America, Yugoslavia increased its borrowing from the West in order to compensate for lost revenues. However, Yugoslavia’s debt increased dramatically, escalating to $20.5 billion in 1981. As a result, Western lenders now demanded that Yugoslavia leaders make difficult decisions, including the imposition of structural adjustment policies and various austerity programs. Although such decisions would eventually help Yugoslavia stabilize its economy, it came at a terrible political price as workers lost their jobs and prices of goods rose, in turn resulting in widespread discontent that fueled a substantial workers’ movement demanding change.[12]According to scholar Steven Vasilevski, “by the mid-1980s, the political and economic foundations of the Yugoslav system – a system commonly called “Titoism” – began to crumble. Nationalism festered in all the constituent republics.”[13] As mentioned, all republics suffered economically; however, in conjunction with the federal composition of Yugoslavia, no republican leader had to assume responsibility for the economic crisis consuming the country. Thus, when the economic crisis began to affect politics substantially in the republics in the mid-1980s, each republic’s leadership placed all blame on the other republics for their nation’s economic misfortunes in an attempt to maintain power and legitimacy. Not only was this method successful in delegitimizing economic criticism, it resonated deeply with the burgeoning nationalist movements that were emerging throughout the country, especially among Kosovo Serbs and Slovenes. Overall, the economic crisis forced communist politicians to become nationalists, a move which could potentially save their selfish desire for maintenance of power but would help foster moments of disaster for the country at-large.[14] In short, by the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia harbored two important preconditions for mass mobilization to democratization: a failing economy and a vibrant civil society.Civil SocietyIn the case of the Yugoslavtransition to democracy, it is vastly different from other Eastern Europeancases where civil society is concerned for two main reasons. First, unlikeelsewhere in Eastern Europe, civil society was fairly strong in Yugoslavia as aconsequence of the country’s good economic and political relationship with theWest. As a result of this relationship, liberalism maintained popularity in thestate. More importantly, Yugoslavia’s historical efforts in decentralizing itsgovernment resulted in less repressive republican states. Furthermore,Yugoslavia created a social context in which civic associations maintained afair reputation through its participatory political arrangements and traditionof organized labor, respectively.[15]Second, and in further contrast with surrounding countries, the civil society groups emerging in Yugoslavia at the time were not those typically expected. In countries like Czechoslovakia and East Germany, human rights and democratization groups became forces of reckoning. However, as a result of its liberal elements, such groups did not create as significant of an impact in Yugoslavia as they had elsewhere. Instead, nationalist and workers’ groups, respectively, mobilized the largest number of participants. The relatively advantageous position of civil society in Yugoslavia failed to generate a pro-democracy challenge against the state – both federal and republican levels – becoming quickly marginalized by workers and nationalists.According to Steven Vasilevsk, Yugoslav civil society,while stronger than in most other Eastern European states, was comparativelyless important than political and economic change from above. However,Vasilevsk’s argument is not fully accurate. While it is true that change wasaccompanied by actions of society’s elites, it was civil society movements thatultimately forced politicians to abandon the past of Tito. While civil societyonly entered national politics fully in the 1980s, scholars have dated thebeginning of civil society mobilization to the early 1960s. As in other EasternEuropean countries, some of the earliest civil society mobilization effortsincluded calls for democratization and human rights.[16]Labor MovementsThe two most important socialmovements of the Yugoslavian transition process were the labor and nationalistmovements. While other civil society groups had legitimate grievances to vent,the Yugoslav workers found themselves in a unique situation. By its owndefinition, Yugoslavia was a workers’ state. As a result, unlike other groupswithin civil society, workers were rarely ever scrutinized by socialistpoliticians. Regardless, despite “sharply deteriorating living standards, theworking class was surprisingly quiescent in the early 1980s.”[17] Whilestrikes occurred, they had taken place on a manageable level, normally lastingfor only a few hours. However, by 1984, the state of workers’ affairsdrastically began to shift, eventually spinning out of control by 1987. “Inthat year,” Nebojša Vladisavljevi? reports,therewere 1685 registered strikes and roughly 4.3 percent of all employees in thehuge state-controlled sector of the economy took part in strikes as opposed toless than 1 percent in previous years. The workers’ protest now lasted longerthan a day on average and, significantly, the number of strikes in large stateenterprises, with more than 500 workers, was sharply on the increase. Roughlyhalf of the strikers came from the heavy industries and mining, but strikes inother sectors of the economy, as well as in health services and education,became increasingly frequent. In 1988 the number of strikes and strikersfurther increased, especially in large enterprises, and strikes became longeron average.[18]Inshort, workers throughout the country began to voice their discontent with theregime. However, their protests maintained an overwhelming focus on economicand workplace related issues, causing political change to be turned into a sidematter.[19]The demand of the workers centered on higher pay and subsidies “for theirdeteriorating enterprises, the removal of unsuccessful or corrupt enterprisedirectors and a sharp reduction in bureaucracy and administration within andoutside enterprises.”[20]Nationalist /Ethnic MovementsWhile the workers’ privileged position withinsocialist ideology delivered them significant influence in their protestsagainst the state, it was the nationalist movements that would tear Yugoslaviaapart. The idea of nationalism was not a new phenomenon in Yugoslavia; thecountry had only been able to successfully establish itself due to Tito’srepression of nationalist debate. Although virtually all national groups weremobilized by the end of the 1980s,Theroad to civil war began in March 1981 when Albanian students took their demandsfor better conditions at the University of Prishtine to the streets in thetime-honored tradition of students everywhere. Their demonstration touched anerve of Albanian patriotic feeling, and over the next month anti-Serbiandemonstrations demanding that Kosova become a Yugoslav republic became somassive that the federal government sent in troops.[21]TheKosova Serb movement began in 1985 with a protest outside the headquarters ofKosova Communist Party. Not receiving the remedy, they sought, the movementsubmitted a petition with 2,011 signatures to the presidency of the SerbianCommunist Party in early 1986, “demanding radical measures to stop thecontinuing harassment of non-Albanians.”[22]From this point on, the movement quickly gathered momentum.Afterthe first protest rally of a hundred Kosovo Serbs staged in 1986 in Belgrade,similar rallies, with greater numbers of participants, were organized inBelgrade as well as Kosovo and Serbian cities. The organizers of these protestswere Serb and Montenegrin farmers, skilled workers, teachers and low-rankingcommunist officials. This gave the movement the look of an anti-elite,grassroots movement of harassed Serb and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo.[23]Unfortunately, the tensions between Serbs and Albanians quickly spread across Yugoslavia as other republican leaders saw Slobodan Milosevic as a proponent of a “Greater Serbia,” a historical concept that had only been repressed by the creation of Yugoslavia. Consequently, nationalists throughout the federation came to seize on the notion of sovereignty. Pavkovic explains:One ofthe primary aims of each of the dissident national ideologies was to reaffirmthe sovereignty of ‘its’ nation over the territory that was claimed for it. TheCroat and Slovene national idealogues saw the reaffirmation of sovereigntynecessitating the creation of national armed forces within a new Yugoslavconfederation or outside Yugoslavia. The reaffirmation of the sovereignty ofthe Muslims was to be carried out first through the reintroduction of Islamicvalues in public life and politics and eventually in the creation of an Islamicstate. Albanian sovereignty was to be achieved first in a separate Yugoslavrepublic and then, possibly, in unification with Albania. Serb sovereignty wasto be reaffirmed in the unification of all Serbs in a reorganized ‘democraticintegrative’ Yugoslav federation; if this proved to be impossible, in a Serbstate without other Yugoslav nations.[24]Needlessto say, the simultaneous realization of all of these aspirations was simplyimpossible. The central issue was that some republics wanted moredecentralization, or even independence, while Serbia, considered the heart ofYugoslavia, was not remotely interested. In the context of such a severeeconomic crisis and the disrepute of socialism as an economic ideology, fewpossessed the power, or rather the desire, to fight the strong nationalistmovements that mobilized across the country. As one scholar summarizes thesituation, “nationalism became a dominant political force largely as anunintended outcome of high levels of mobilization and spiraling social,economic and political conflicts in a complex, authoritarian multi-national statewhich experienced a severe economic crisis.”[25]More importantly, the intentions of republic leaders to gain from thenationalist tendencies running rampant with Yugoslavia did little to preventthis development.Democratization in the Successor StatesCivil war in Yugoslavia began with multi-party elections. In the context of nationalist mobilization and the need for politicians to denounce and disassociate themselves from the country’s communist past, pluralism and multi-party elections became tactics of political survival. Consequently, by the end of 1990, “all of the six Yugoslav republics had elected, in more or less free elections, new legislatures and new presidents.”[26] While parties embracing liberalism made themselves widely known in many of the republics, all six presidents elected were former communists, and more importantly, two – Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegro’s Momir Bulatovic – “continued to rule in the manner of their predecessors.”[27] Thus, in many of the countries, it is fair to speak of the process of rapid democratization. In addition, independence came rapidly to most of the former Yugoslav republics. With the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, the entity that, at least for a reasonable portion of time, retained the name of Yugoslavia, all the federated republics had declared independency by 1993. Montenegro would finally achieve independence in 2006.[28] However, only in Slovenia did theprocess of democratization develop somewhat fully in a rather short length oftime. As the wealthiest and most European-integrated country of the republics,Slovenia quickly seceded from the federation, and with European support, itavoided the possibility of a violent clash with the rest of the former country.The Slovenian socialist elites sought to use the country’s conflict withSerbia’s Milosevic to propagate themselves as the leaders of the new liberalregime, multi-party election and Western integration made the possibility ofauthoritarianism unlikely. Thus, “just two years into independence, Sloveniahad a new constitution, a politically pluralist landscape with ten parties inthe Parliament, a free press, and an independent judiciary.”[29]Unlike elsewhere in Yugoslavia, “the process of drafting a constitution thatwould be the mainstay of Slovenia’s a new democracy unfolded …smoothly, alongwith most democratization measures.”[30]As change finally came to Croatia, it did so through an election victory for the opposition. Unlike in the Serbian case where Milosevic refused to accept defeat, the Croatian dictator Franjo Tu?man had died the previous year, and mass protests were therefore unnecessary to institute a political change. Yet, civil society groups still acted in important roles. Civil society groups continued to benefit from the relatively liberal political climate of the 1980s. Organizations such as GONG (Citizens Organized to Monitor Voting) and Glas 99 (Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections) waged numerous effective get-out-the-vote campaigns in favor of the democratic opposition coalition and engaged in independent election monitoring, respectively. Similar to Serbia, foreign governments and NGOs, respectively, supplied large sums of money and resources to facilitate the Croatian efforts. In short, democratization in Croatia came from above in the sense that no mass mobilization on the streets proved necessary to force political change. Still, civil society organization played an important role in their support of the democratic opposition.[31]The popular overthrow of Serbia’s Milosevic in 2000 set the stage for democratization in Serbia, but despite the encouraging beginnings of post-Milosevic Serbia, scholars did not consider the country democratized until “late 2003.”[32] Similar to foreign treatment of Tu?man, the West had tolerated Milosevic’s authoritarian leanings. However, scholars like Boduszy?ski have pointed out that “though some popular accounts have portrayed Milosevic as a dictator akin to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Milosevic did not rule by terror or total control of information” and even allowed criticism of his regime.[33] However, in reality, the Serbian political power balance presented itself in much more complex manner. As Levitsky and Way point out,theSerbian regime was always competitive. No major parties were banned and, priorto the late 1990s, no major politicians were killed, imprisoned, exiled, orexcluded from elections. Moreover, elections were not simply a façade. Outrightfraud was relatively limited in scope, which meant that Milosevic had toattract significant popular support to win presidential elections. Legislativeelections also were highly competitive. In fact, the SPS never won a majorityof the legislative vote and, after 1992, it never held a parliamentarymajority. Thus, Milosevic at time struggled to control parliament and even toprevent votes of no confidence.[34]Still,Milosevic managed to cling to both power and considerable popularity bypainting a picture of a Serbia under attack, and as president he was able tocircumvent the political process by issuing laws by decree. It would takemilitary humiliation combined with an economic crisis to severely delegitimizeMilosevic’s regime. Efforts by Western powers pushed in delegitimizing theregime by providing opposition groups with money and training, which resultedin a viable presidential candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, backed by a nonviolentstudent movement, Otpor. Overall, while democratic gains emerged after the fallof Milosevic, the country itself would not fully democratize until 2003.Macedonia’s economic weakness meant that federal Yugoslav paternalism was to be replaced by Western paternalism. Thus, monetary aid flowed into the country in an effort to stimulate enough economic development to stifle the ethnic tensions brewing between Macedonians and Albanians. As the country dealt with no active dissident movement and a weak post-communist civil society, foreign NGOs became Macedonia’s “de facto civil society.”[35] As a result, policy became the responsibility of the West to form and the Macedonian government simply had to follow the orders of its international donors. What resulted in Macedonian is what Boduszy?ski refers to as “simulated democracy” – a democratic façade designed to satisfy donors and keep aid flowing into the country.[36] Although Western micromanagement was far from ideal, it allowed Macedonia to avoid probable violence between opposed ethnic groups that seemed to torment much of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Overall, the democratization of Macedonian became possible due to the economic interventionism of Western powers.Of the six former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina remain the saddest in terms of democratization. Having served as a battlefield during the brutal war of the early 1990s, the wounds of the country are still healing. In order to end the war, a compromise solution was established that divided the country into “two virtually separate entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbian-dominated Republika Srpska.”[37] The details of the agreement sought to protect all three ethnic groups within the region from further victimization. However, the consequences of such an arrangement are a paralyzed central state, one that cannot make any major policy decisions as both entities retain the right to veto any decision. As a result of mutual distrust between the two entities, the process of democratization and economic reform, respectively, have been “painstakingly sluggish” as the country remains in its initial political transition.[38]ConclusionEvenwithin the admittedly complex universe of democratization processes,Yugoslavia’s transition to democracy stands out as particularly complicated.The range of actors and ethnic groups involved makes Yugoslavia incrediblymultifaceted. Yugoslavia’s civil society actor seem to have had more in commonwith Western Europe than activists in other socialist countries. If thisobservation is correct, it points to a potentially important theoretical point:in a context of democratization efforts, civil society is, rathercounter-intuitively, more potent when repressed and working below ground thanwhen given the ability to maneuver freely. In the case of Yugoslavia, liberalcivil society groups, such as democratization and human rights groups, lackedthe repression to make their efforts effective. If authoritarianism is not amajor issue in people’s everyday lives, neither can the struggle against such asystem exist. This interesting dynamic is reinforced if other concerns emergeas more salient, such as nationalism and economic failure. Thus, in theYugoslav case, the democratization movement did not fail because ofauthoritative repression mandated by the state, but rather because rivalmovements, in particular ethnic and nationalist ones, came to dominate civilsociety as mass mobilization.ReferencesBoduszy?ski, Mieczys?aw P. Regime Change in the Yugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths toward a New Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.Bunce, Valerie J. Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.Gibianskii, Leonid. “The Soviet-Yugoslav Split” in Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule. Oxford, UK: Berg Press, 2006.Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010.Licht, Sonja. “Civil Society, Democracy, and the Yugoslav Wars” in The Lesson of Yugoslavia. New York, NY: Elsevier Press, 2000.Pavkovic, Aleksandar. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 2000.Schaeffer, Robert K. “Democratization, Division and War in Yugoslavia: A Comparative Perspective” in The Lesson of Yugoslavia. New York, NY: Elsevier Press, 2000.Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993.Vasilevski, Steven. “Diverging Paths, Diverging Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Transition in the Successor States of Yugoslavia” in YCISS Post-Communist Studies Programme Research Paper Series. Toronto, ON: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 2007.Vladisavljevi?, Nebojša. Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995.[1] Nebojša Vladisavljevi?,Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution:Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Houndmills,UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.[2] Ibid.[3] Valerie J. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and theDestruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), 111.[4] Ibid.[5] Ibid., 111-14.[6] Mieczys?aw P.Boduszy?ski, Regime Change in theYugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths toward a New Europe (Baltimore,MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 119; Steven Vasilevski,“Diverging Paths, Diverging Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of Post-CommunistTransition in the Successor States of Yugoslavia” in YCISS Post-Communist Studies Progra