The transformation of terrorism shifted around September 11th, 2001, when the United States was attacked by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda, and has been embroiled in asystematic warfare in the region since. Prior to the attacks on 9/11, the United States has meddled in international policy in the Middle East for decades, attempting to implement United States and United Nations terrorism policy efforts with coordination from the international community against terrorism. According to Richard Best, author of Intelligence and Law Enforcement, Best notes that “since the end of World War II, various types of terrorist activities and human rights violations has resulted in significant United States intervention, in retaliation to genocide, torture, hostage taking, attacks on diplomatic personnel, and airplane hijacking” (Best, 2001, 7). In response to these atrocities, the United States uses two main weapons traditionally relied upon in the fight against terrorism, military force and economic sanctions, neither of which will solve the problem of international terrorism, nor will be particularly effective against the stateless, transnational groups that are evolving in the region. Although many nations, specifically Muslim nations who are at the heart of many of these violent attacks seek to prevent and destroy terrorism, the United States and United Nations terrorism policy efforts are not without obstructions to international cooperation. The United Statesterrorism policies that lack international cooperation are the frequentretaliatory operations in the Middle East and Africa, which often negates theprogresses made due to unintended repercussions which cannot be anticipated.Another United States terrorism policy which lacks international cooperation isthe United States refusal to negotiate with terrorist organizations, even when thoseorganizations are deeply entrenched in the fabric of the nation’s politics andculture; groups like Hezbollah or Hamas. A third United States terrorism policywhich lacks international cooperation is United States extradition laws andobtaining the cooperation of international law enforcement. The last UnitedStates terrorism policy which lacks international cooperation is the excessiveuse of economic sanctions which have been deemed ineffective.The United States has beenembroiled in warfare in the Middle East for decades due to various types ofterrorist activities and human rights violations such as genocide, torture,attacks on diplomatic personnel, and airplane hijacking. When any of theseactivities occur, the United States and its allies jump to the aid of theoppressed, but often lack the ability to notice nuances in the region and areinsensitive to public opinion. United States retaliatory operations in theMiddle East and Africa often negate any and all progresses made due tounintended repercussions of war which cannot be anticipated, specificallyinflicting collateral damage. One example of United States retaliatoryoperations is on August 7th, 1998, two simultaneous truck bombexplosions went off at the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,the other at the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. A total of 213 peoplewere killed in Nairobi, while 11 were killed in Dar es Salaam. Of the 224people killed in the embassy bombings, 12 Americans were killed. After thebombing, according to Bruce Hoffman, the moderate opinion in the Arab world“were horrified by the fact that innocents were killed and also that Muslimswere involved” (Hoffman, 2001, 7) and the Arab media pushed people in thedirection of condemning bin Laden and terrorism. Unfortunately, in retaliationfor the bombing, but more specifically, because of the 12 Americans werekilled, President Bill Clinton issued a series of cruise missile strikes ontargets in Sudan and Afghanistan, which instantly negated any sentiments fromthe Arab world. According to Hoffman, the retaliatory strikes “took the focusaway from the U.S., Kenyan, and the Tanzanian victims and put it on Sudan as avictim” (Hoffman, 2001, 7). Furthermore, on April 6th, 1986, theUnited States launched air strikes against Libya in retaliation for the April 5th,1986 Berlin discotheque bombing. Although the United States made its bestefforts to minimize collateral damage, some of the aerial bombardment landed off-target,striking civilian sites in Tripoli, killing 36 Libyan civilians and injuringalmost 100 more. Despite the United States best efforts to minimize civiliancasualties, the United States become the problem, amplifying the civilian bodycount in the region. According to Douglas Menarchik, “cruise missiles andair-delivered precision-guided munitions can be effective retaliation againststate sponsors and transnational groups when they can be found and preciselytargeted” (Menarchik, 2001, 18), although terrorist groups losing their safehavens in countries formally sponsors of terrorism, and are being forced deeperunderground intertwined in the fabric of modern society, making precisetargeting of individuals nearly impossible.Another United Statesterrorism policy which lacks international cooperation is that the UnitedStates has a longstanding policy of not negotiating with terroristorganizations, even when those organizations are deeply entrenched in thefabric of the nation’s politics and culture. During the late eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, American transport ships were frequently raided by “seaborne banditsfrom Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers” (DOS, 2001, 2) and had become routine for theUnited States to negotiate with these pirates and to pay the huge ransoms. Bythe early 1800’s, the United States were paying out over one-fifth of thecountry’s yearly revenue in ransoms. Shortly afterward, President ThomasJefferson implemented “his no-concessions policy with military action” (DOS,2001, 2). In 1803, the USS Philadelphia was captured and demanded a $3 millionransom. In retaliation, United States forces “blockaded Tripoli, set fire tothe Philadelphia, and bombarded the city”, which resulted in the piratesreleasing the American hostages. Over 200 years later, the United Statescontinues to uphold the policies that Thomas Jefferson employed, that theUnited States will refuse to make concessions to terrorists.Although President ThomasJefferson’s policy refusing to negotiate with terrorists has ultimately beeneffective since its implementation, the face of terrorism are continuouslychanging and adapting. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam“engage in intensive lobbying and political pressure as a means of legitimization,to enhance the stature of these groups, as a means of PR to try to convincecountries that the groups are not terrorist organizations” (Hoffman, 2001, 4).Moreover, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are actually suing the UnitedStates government in District Court to be taken off the list of designatedterrorist organizations. Furthermore, groups like Hezbollah or Hamas, who areboth deeply entrenched in the fabric of the nation’s politics and culture, arefunded by supporters in the general populace in their respective countries, and“raise money through mosques and social service institutions, as well as fromwealthy private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other states” (DOS, 2001, 5).Although both Hezbollah and Hamas are on the State Department’s list ofdesignated terrorist organizations, most Middle Eastern countries differentiatebetween Hezbollah and Hamas’s political and military wings.A third United Statesterrorism policy which lacks international cooperation is United Statesextradition laws and obtaining the cooperation of international lawenforcement. International cooperation in areas of law enforcement andintelligence is an essential pillar of the United States anti-terrorism policyand is an important law enforcement tool in combating international terrorism.The United States had developed a series of new ways to combat terrorism,specifically extraditions and renditions, as terrorism has changed and oldcapabilities appeared to lose effectiveness. An extradition is a cooperativelaw enforcement process which the custody of a person charged with committing acrime whose punishment has not yet been fully served, is transferred directlyor indirectly, to those of another jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecution.According to Richard Best, internationally, narcotics trade “is not at presentconsidered an international crime over which there is universal jurisdiction”(Best, 2001, 8), although countries are expected to suppress the production andtransit of illegal narcotics. Furthermore, it is the individual country’sresponsibility to bring drug traffickers to justice, and respond to requestsfor extradition, although there is “no universal jurisdiction to enforce drugproduction or trafficking as they do under conventions against piracy, torture,and certain other crimes” (Best, 2001, 8).The last United Statesterrorism policy which lacks international cooperation is the excessive use ofeconomic sanctions which have been deemed ineffective. According to JamesSmith, author of Terrorism Threat andResponse, “economic sanctions and threats of force may be more useful inresponse to state-sponsored terrorism, but economic incentives and increasedintelligence efforts may prove more suitable for the growing non-state threat”(Smith, 2001, 4). Furthermore, according to David Tucker, author of Combating International Terrorism, notesthat “economic sanctions are unlikely by themselves to change the behavior of astate” (Tucker, 2001, 9). Sanctions impose costs on the target country and fromits ability to support terrorism. Although sanctions are meant to hurt the willof a country, typically sanctions impose greater costs on the mass of people.While economic sanctions will not lead to the collapse of a country, nor will acountry give in to economic sanctions, increased public disaffection will eventuallyenable the target government to devote more attention and resources to combatingterrorism. Some of the advantages tousing soft diplomacy techniques are the use of “multilateral economic andpolitical sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism” (Gottlieb, 2014, 210),in addition to the use of negotiating policies as a means of breaking up ordestroying terrorist groups and networks. Another advantage is the ability tobring in state or organizational leaders to a negotiating table in which theirdemands will have an opportunity to be heard. An example of the limits of economicsanctions can be noted by the United States and Iran. Iran has been undereconomic sanctions since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and has been expandedseveral times due to Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. and UNsanctions initially targeted investments in oil, gas, and petrochemicals, andexports of refined petroleum products. US led sanctions encompass banking andinsurance transactions, shipping, web-hosting services, and domain nameregistration services. Although sanctions have dramatically reduced the amountof money available to Iran, to the point where the values of the Iranian Rialhave dropped dramatically since sanctions were imposed, although Iran “has notchanged its support for terrorists because of the sanctions” (Gottlieb, 2014, 119),nor is Iran willing to give up their nuclear ambitions. As Gottlieb notes,“short of military conflict that could destabilize the whole region” (Gottlieb,2014, 119), top-level negotiations are required for any chance at finding acommon ground.  The principal impedimentsto international cooperation against retaliatory operations in the Middle Eastand Africa can be seen with the amount of collateral damage from United Statesretaliating to various types of terrorist activities and human rightsviolations, effectively diminishing the perception of the United States in theinternational community. Although the rational for retaliation is often justified,the act of retaliation causes significantly more harm than good. A few examplesof United States retaliatory operations can be seen with the 1983 Lebanon bombing,1986 bombing of Libya, and the 1998 bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan. On October 23, 1983, twotruck bombs struck buildings used for housing the Multinational Force inLebanon (MNF) peacekeepers. The United States and French service members werespecifically targeted, killing 241 U.S. and 58 French peacekeepers. Inretaliation for the two bombings, the United States and France joined togetherto commit an air assault on the Lebanese camp where the bombing was planned. Ultimately,the international response to United States retaliation was condemned by manycountries as an unprovoked act of aggression. Furthermore, on April 6th,1986, the United States launched air strikes against Libya in retaliation forthe April 5th, 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing which killed 229civilians. The retaliatory airstrikes used by the United States killed anestimated 20 Libyan military personnel and another 60 civilians. According toHoffman, “the 1986 air strike on Libyan forces was widely touted and believedto be an archetype of success of using flying forces against terrorists”(Hoffman, 2001, 5), but clarifies this by stating that Libyan terrorism did notdiminish, it actually increased dramatically. Prior to the United Statesretaliatory strikes on Libya, there were 41 terrorist attacks on U.S. targets.After the United States retaliatory strikes on Libya, there were 54 terroristattacks on U.S. targets. Another example can be seen on August 7th,1998, two simultaneous truck bomb explosions went off at the United StatesEmbassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the other at the United States Embassy inNairobi, Kenya. A total of 213 people were killed in Nairobi, while 11 werekilled in Dar es Salaam. In retaliation for the bombing, President Bill Clintonissued a series of cruise missile strikes on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan,which instantly negated any sentiments from the Arab world. The principal impediments to international cooperation against the United States refusal to negotiate with terrorist organizations are the changing faces of terrorism and the adaptation of groups for survival. Groups like Hezbollah or Hamas, both of whom are deeply entrenched in the fabric of the respective nation’s politics and culture, are also considered by the State Department to be on the list of designated terrorist organizations. With that being said, the United States policies for dealing with terrorists prevents the United States from having constructive conversations. When responding to incidents of terrorism, the lack of communication channels and mutually accepted rules of conduct between governmental entities and the groups deemed as terrorist organizations is a significant obstacle for the United States to overcome. The United States longstanding policy of not negotiating with terrorists or hostage takers needs to be modified to the changing conditions of the 21st century. Communications with terrorists in some cases may prove beneficial to U.S. interests and may provide some useful insights in dealing with hostile transnational groups in the future.The third impediments tointernational cooperation against the United States are the United Statespolicies on international extradition and law enforcement cooperation. Severallimitations on international extradition include the refusal of some countries toextradite for political or extraterritorial offenses. Other nations outrightrefuse to extradite their own nationals. Furthermore, the United States policyon application of the death penalty for certain crimes and can significantly impedeextradition from countries that have abolished the death penalty many cases. The terms and conditions of extradition treaties varygreatly. Some countries forbid the extradition of their own nationals, no matter what the circumstances of the crimes which tookplace, countries like Brazil and China. Furthermore, in order for aninternational extradition to be successful, the criminal must also berecognized as a crime in both jurisdictions to fulfill dual criminality, theact must not be political in nature, as most countries refuse to extraditesuspects of political crimes, and many countries will refuse to extradite theaccused if they are in danger of receiving the death penalty or torture,inhuman or degrading treatment. The last impediment tointernational cooperation against the United States is the rampant use of economicsanctions in an attempt to curb undesirable behavior, such as providing supportor safe havens for terrorist cells. The United States has placed variouseconomic sanctions on numerous countries, specifically countries of Iran, Libya,North Korea, and Syria. Sanctions impose costs on the target country anddiminish its ability to support terrorism. Moreover, diplomatic sanctionspaired with sanctions on travel, arms embargoes and other measures, economicsanctions can create a sense of isolation among and increase pressure on theelites in a target country” (Tucker, 2001, 9). Although sanctions are meant tohurt the will of a country, typically sanctions impose greater costs on themass of people. The ineffectiveness of sanctions on Iran after over 20 yearsmildly impacted Iran’s economy, but is seemingly still flourishing.Furthermore, sanctions on Iran have not caused Iran’s nuclear capabilities tobe diminished. Sanctions have significantly reduced Iran’s access to productsneeded for the oil and energy sectors and have also caused a decline in oilproduction due to reduced access to the technologies needed to improve theirefficiency. Furthermore, after the Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed, the UnitedNations Security Council in collaboration with the United States implementedsanctions upon Libya in order to curb its state sponsorship of terrorism in theregion. In order to comply with United Nations sanctions in Libya, the UNSecurity Council requires Libya to complete three resolutions, which calls uponLibya to extradite the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, imposes aban on Libyan flights, and bans the sale of oil equipment to Libya, in additionto placing a limited freeze of foreign assets. The UN sanctions against Libyacreated a suffering under isolation and the Libyan economy was negativelyinfluenced. Although most of theUnited States retaliatory acts are justified, Hoffman notes that “as a nation,we derive a certain cathartic satisfaction from getting back, striking back atour enemies” (Hoffman, 2001, 6). An “eye-for-an-eye” international terrorismpolicy will only create further animosity in the international community.Although most terrorist organizations are well funded, they often do not havethe organizational structure or the technological capabilities to gohead-to-head with a governmental body, and are therefore inferior to agovernmental body. When a super-power like the United States retaliates againsta small group of individuals with a vast array of bombardment, fighting caneasily become manipulated as the United States is picking on the weaker Arabnations, effectively creating radical recruitment imagery for terrorists.Rather than continuously engage in retaliatory measures with various countriesthat sponsor terrorism, the United States should explore alternativesemphasizing the nonviolent approach, specifically, a public diplomacy approach.Public diplomacy can play an imperative role in captivating the “hearts andminds” of the region and may impact the attitudes of populations and theactions of governments, but also on the actions of groups engaged in terroristacts. In order to have an effective public diplomacy policy, it is imperativeto mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to takeaction against terrorism. One example of effective public diplomacy is when thePalestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was looking to retire a group ofzealous fanatical terrorists by “marrying them off and getting them families tokeep them away from violence” (Hoffman, 2001, 8). Moreover, the PLO offeredsignificant incentives for people to get married, such as gifting newlyweds“$3,000 and an apartment with a gas stove, refrigerator, a color TV, and a jobwith the PLO” (Hoffman, 2001, 8). Although this was a radical idea, the PLO’sidea of marrying off zealous fanatical terrorists was an amazing success as“not one of them wanted to travel abroad for fear of being arrested and losingall that they had” (Hoffman, 2001, 8). The United States policy ofrefusing to negotiate with terrorist organizations was very effective in the1800’s when the United States was in the process of building itself to become aworld power, and still effective as the dust settled from the September 11thattacks, but the world of terrorism has changed and adapted in the 21stcentury. Groups like HAMAS, Hezbollah, and even the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (FARC) engage in intensive lobbying andpolitical pressures as a means of legitimization. Without bringing groups likeHAMAS and Hezbollah to the negotiating table, a two-state solution to theconflict requires all participants in the democratic process to renounceviolence and terror, which cannot be done if the United States only wants tohear one side. Opening up dialogue between groups the United States deems asterrorist organizations, like HAMAS and Hezbollah, and United States allies;Israel is the first step in ending terrorism violence between the three groups.Terrorism is a global occurrenceand a significant challenge facing policymakers is how to take advantage ofinternational cooperation and support without compromising important UnitedStates national security interests. Significant policy challenges include waysto minimize the economic and civil liberties costs of an enhanced securityenvironment and how to combat provocation to terrorism, especially in instanceswhere terrorist activity is state sponsored. In order to improve cooperationbetween intelligence and international law enforcement agencies, the UnitedStates must have a pro-diplomatic approach. Personal relationships areculturally important in the Middle East, and it may be desirable for the UnitedStates to consider more funding diplomacy, introduce economic inducements suchas long-term investment capabilities and targeted assistance programs aimed toreduce poverty and increase education, which in turn can bring stability toweak countries, compel support for United States policy efforts, and candiminish the appeal of extremist groups. United States investment in the regionin social services, education, and health care will attract a much morepositive image than spending billions of dollars on a war of ideologies, pairedwith the collateral damage of hundreds of innocent civilians. The United States policiesof economic sanctions are uncertain because much of the stream of terrorist financesoccurs outside formal banking channels. Furthermore, one considerable factorfor financial support for terrorist groups is the use of charities, in additionto the frequency of small increments of money required for terrorist acts.Moreover, the financial system in the region makes transfers difficult to trackas personal income records are not kept for tax purposes and many citizensprefer cash transactions, which has been the norm for centuries. Additionally,Islam is premised on the five pillars of Islam, one of which is the zakat, anobligatory tax on wealth, authorized in the Koran. Saudi banks and the royalfamily are subject to a zakat tax, which the royal family alone contributes anestimated $12 billion per year. Of that $12 billion per year, Wazsak notes thatat least 50 percent of the HAMAS budget comes from Saudi Arabia. Trackingcontributions wouldn’t be effective because contributions are often “givenanonymously, and donated funds may be diverted from otherwise legitimatecharities” (Blanchard, 2007, 1). Sanctions can be effective in deterringcertain behaviors, although sometimes economic sanctions do not have theintended effect. Economic sanctions most often negatively affect the welfare ofthe citizens of the sanctioned country because the political elites have accessto exports. The negative effects of the economic sanctions also have theability to adversely affect the relations between countries, damaging anycontinued collaboration in the future. In the desire to combatterrorism in a political context, the United States often faces conflictinggoals and courses of action. The United States main goal is to provide securityagainst terrorist acts, limiting the freedom of individual terrorists to assembleand support networks to operate in an unregulated environment and maintainingindividual freedoms and human rights in the homeland. Efforts to combatterrorism are intricate due to the global trend towards deregulation, openborders, and expanded commerce. The United States has constitutional limitswithin their policies which often conflicts directly with a desire to securethe homeland effectively against terrorist activity. One challenge forpolicymakers is the retaliatory strikes on nations who engage in terrorismactivities or those who offer sanctuary to individuals whom are known to committerrorist acts. Another challenge for policymakers is changing the narrative onUnited States negotiation policies with terrorists. Groups like HAMAS and Hezbollahhave popular political wings that engage in social services and havesignificant backing of their citizens and surrounding neighbors. As theinternational community increasingly demonstrates its ability to unite andapply economic sanctions against states, states will become less likely toovertly support terrorist groups or engage in state-sponsored terrorism. BibliographyBest, R. A.,& Library of Congress. (2001). Intelligence and law enforcement:Countering transnational threats to the U.S. Washington, DC: CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Congress. Blanchard, C. M.,Prados, A. B., & Library of Congress. (2007). Saudi Arabia:Terrorist financing issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional ResearchService, Library of Congress. Department of State.(2001). International Incident Response. The Terrorism Threat and U.S.Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors. Hoffman, B.(2001). Foreword: Twenty-First Century Terrorism. The Terrorism Threat andU.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors. In Gottlieb, S.(2014). Debating terrorism and counterterrorism: Conflicting perspectives oncauses, contexts, and responses. Menarchik, D.(2001). Organizing to Combat 21st Century Terrorism. The Terrorism Threatand U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors. Probst, P.(2001). Intelligence and Force Protection vs. Terrorism. The TerrorismThreat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors.Smith, J.(2001). The Terrorist Threat in Strategic Context. The Terrorism Threat andU.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors. Tucker, D.(2001). Combating International Terrorism. The Terrorism Threat and U.S.Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors. Waszak, J.(2004). The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist Financing. CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law. Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more