To what extent dogender quotas solve the problem of women’sunderrepresentation?Gender quotas within the political sphere are defined by Bacchi, as “a form of affirmative action, aimed at increasing women’s representation in elected legislative bodies” (2006, 32). The three most popular types of quota used are voluntary party quotas, legislated candidate quotas and legislated reserved seats (IDEA, 2013). Voluntary party quotas refer to certain political parties setting up a quota to “guarantee the nomination of a certain number or proportion of women” (Chen, 2010), as seen in countries such as Sweden or the UK. This differs to the likes of legislated candidate quotas in which the constitution or party law governs the minimum percentage of women candidates, as seen in the case of Ireland, Belgium or France. Lastly, legislated reserved seats, which directly refer to the number of seats which women are to take up within a parliament; although it is the least common type of quota used, 36 countries adopt this system and range from the likes of Tanzania to Rwanda to Pakistan (IDEA, 2013).It is undeniable that the use of quotas has increased significantly since the Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing in 1995; which aimed to tackle the disparities in women’s access to political decision making within power structures (Dahlerup & Friedanvall, 2008). However, the question as to whether they solve the problem of underrepresentation still remains. Representation itself can be defined in descriptive terms, referencing the overall proportion of women in the political sphere; or it could be substantive, referring to women politicians acting explicitly for women’s interests. In most cases, quotas are seen to be “measures that target gender bias in the candidate selection process, with the goal of increasing women’s descriptive representation” (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). The assumption being that these women will act in the interests of women. However, it must be noted that the descriptive representation of women in Parliaments does not necessarily translate into substantive representation or even effective descriptive representation; often there are a wide variety of factors which influence representation outside of quotas. This can be in the form of institutional factors such as the electoral system that is already in place. In addition to this, socio-cultural values regarding the place of women in society, and contradictory issues such as the mandate effect or the label effect all impact on how quota women are perceived, thereby limiting their effectiveness. As well as this, design and implementation factors are massively influential in determining the success of quotas and how they merge with the current electoral system; this can be seen through the differences between PR and majoritarian system as well as the effectiveness of enforcement methods used for non-complying parties. As a result of this, the extent of which quotas solve the problem of women’s underrepresentation is limited, as their success is largely reliant on additional factors; proving that the use of quotas alone is not enough to solve problems surrounding underrepresentation, both in descriptive and substantive terms. The increased use of quotasis a response to the UN Fourth Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995, whichhighlighted that at the time, only 10% of seats in national legislatures werebeing held by women, with a lower percentage holding ministerial seats (UN,1995). Quotas are now targeted to improving the descriptive representation ofwomen within politics (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). This refers toimproving the numbers of women in Parliaments in the hope that this will evolveinto a ‘critical mass’ which will help to determine public policy outcomes.This is highlighted by the likes of Lovenduski who argued that “when a groupreaches a certain size, critical mass theory suggests that there will be aqualitative change in the nature of group interactions, as the minority startsto assert itself and thereby transform the institutional culture, norms andvalues.” (2005, 142) Therefore, by improving the descriptive representation ofwomen in politics, it will automatically translate into a change of attitudes,culture and policy outcomes, which will assist in an increase in policyoutcomes benefitting women, therefore positively increasing substantiverepresentation. However, whilst quotas are often successful in improving thedescriptive representation of women as seen in Latin America, in which Mexico,Nicaragua, Argentina and Bolivia are all in the top twenty countries forwomen’s representation in Parliament (IPU,2017). This descriptiverepresentation has not translated into effective substantive representation, inwhich women policy makers will act in such a way that will benefit womenconstituents.  An interesting case studyfrom this perspective is Argentina, which despite its strong descriptive representationat 38.9% (IPU, 2017) lacks a strong substantive representation, in which manyof the bills that have been introduced which positively impact women are notpassed. Henceforth, despite the fact that women within government are trying toact on the substantive interests of women, on the basis that the introductionof bills surrounding sexual harassment and reproductive rights increasedcumulatively as descriptive representation increased (Franceschet &Piscopo, 2008). It must be noted that there is a difference between theintroduction of bills and the policy outcomes as these bills were very rarelyfollowed through. This is because outside factors are hugely influential indetermining the policies that are passed in the Argentinian government. Some ofthese factors are reflected in informal institutional practices such as worktimes, location of strategy meetings and most importantly, the attitudestowards women attending meetings. This highlights an innate double standard,observed by Franceschet and Piscopo who reported that ‘If they (women) skip themeeting, they are treated as uncommitted to their work and thus loseprofessional respect. If they attend, however, they are considered moresexually freewheeling, and thus lose personal respect.” (2008). Because ofthese factors, women parliamentarians find it increasingly difficult toestablish a substantive presence. These misunderstandings regarding the impactthat descriptive representation has on substantive representation is also seenin Uganda. Although women hold a critical minority in Parliament at 34% (WorldBank, 2017), there are a wide variety of outside factors which detersubstantive representation greatly. One of the most important factors is partypatronisation, which “divides women and hinders their ability to strengthentheir substantive representation” (Barenzi, 2014). In addition to this, manywomen feel that they are motivated more by party loyalties than through thepromotion of women’s interests with one MP stating: “we are not strong enoughon the ground because we are also still learning and therefore you feel rightat the back of the political party, therefore you must follow all the do’s anddon’ts” (Barenzi, 2014). This links back to the issues surrounding criticalmass theory and quotas, as despite the ‘critical mass’ figure being met, womendon’t feel as if they can fully represent the interests of women withoutfurther stigmatisation, proving that additional factors are extremelyinfluential in helping or hindering women’s representation despite the use ofquotas. Thereby demonstrating that the extent of which quotas are successful atsolving the problem of representation is limited. Furthering this, Uganda alsohas very poor public education campaigns and a substantial media bias againstwomen. This has been explicitly demonstrated regarding the advancement of theMarriage and Divorce Bill in the 9th Parliament (Barenzi, 2014) inwhich woman still find it extremely difficult to gain a divorce. Consequently,the quota system within Uganda has been described as “a legal quota system thataccelerated descriptive representation, yet explicitly disrupts substantiverepresentation” (Barenzi, 2014). This could be a result of the ‘label’ effect,in which women are often the result of negative labelling and stereotyped asbeing ‘unqualified’. Indeed, this argument has been highlighted by Clayton, whofound that a potential backlash of quotas can result in ‘women’s issuesbecoming a less salient or less prestigious agenda’ (2016). This weakensinitiatives for substantive representation as women must comply to the statusquo in order to be taken seriously; this is something that quotas are unable totackle as this is a result of institutional or cultural barriers (Krook, 2010).This presents clear evidence of the shortcomings of quota systems, especiallywhen they are implemented from the ‘top down’, as whilst it may raise the numberof women in Parliaments, they are limited in guaranteeing effective substantiverepresentation in Parliaments, because both formal and informal institutionalpractices limit the effect that women can have for women in Parliament; therebylimiting their effectiveness in solving problems regarding women’sunderrepresentation. In addition to this, quotasalso are limiting in solving the problem of women’s underrepresentation on thebasis that they are unable to govern the type of woman put forward in candidatelists. This is important on the basis that it will not prevent corruption,nepotism and elitism within the political process which is central in obtainingan effective representative democracy. For example, in Argentina, quotas areineffective in preventing ‘mujeres de’, literally translating to ‘women of’, inthis case referring to political parties placing “wives or relatives of maleparty leaders”; with one commenter observing that the ‘mujeres de’ were “silentwomen who never spoke or acted until instructed by party bosses” (Franceschet& Piscopo, 2008). Therefore, although quotas may improve the overall descriptiverepresentation of women in parliaments, they do little to ensure that the womenwho are placed for candidacy aren’t merely replacing their male relatives(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008); thereby implying that women are mere tokenswithin the political system. Argentina is not an isolated case regarding quotasnot representing the wider public, as the the AWS system in Britain tended tofavour more ‘elite women’, elite in this sense is defined as ‘Oxbridge’graduates (Nugent & Krook, 2015) and found that AWS women were more ‘elite’than their Labour counterparts. This has been emphasised by Owen Jones whostated, “AWS have been successful in expanding the career options of a tinyelite of professional, university educated women” (Nugent & Krook, 2015).This obviously is not a clear representation of the British population who arenot university educated at this level. This demonstrates that whilst quotas arecapable in improving descriptive representation, they have little impact inpolicing the type of candidates put forward. This clearly highlights theirlimitations in solving the problems of women’s representation; as despite theirsuccesses in promoting descriptive representation, they are severely limited insolving women’s underrepresentation in terms of class and race and are overlysimplified on the basis that the experiences of a white, middle-class,university educated parliamentarian will be extremely different to a workingclass, black woman. Following on from this,quotas are also limited in monitoring how far women can pursue and gainpositions of power within the political process. It is true that with quotas,the number of women in Parliament do improve; but how much power do they wield,and can they gain enviable positions of power? This argument has been putforward by Folke and Rickne who argued that “despite women’s advances,descriptive evidence abounds that female representation in positions ofinfluence” (2012). Thereby, proving that whilst quotas can be effective inimproving overall representation in the countries in which they are implementedthey are relatively ineffective in helping women get to significant positionsof power and influence. This has been demonstrated again in Latin Americancountries in which women parliamentarians aren’t effectively represented in‘power committees’ and have little control over important decisions withineconomic, defence or foreign affairs sectors and are often side-lined torelatively unimportant ‘women’s issues’ and ‘social’ committees (Michelle-Heath,Schwindt-Bayer, Taylor-Robinson, 2005). One way to perhaps remedy this would beto introduce quotas at the highest levels of office such as in cabinet orministerial positions where they are privy to the highest levels ofdecision-making and power. Perhaps a more radical way of improving thisrepresentation would be to introduce quotas for men, as suggested by RainbowMurray, who argues that gender quotas are a problematic way in promoting theidea that ‘men are the norm and women are the “other”’ (2014). Consequently, byimplementing these quotas at the highest levels of decision making could bebeneficial in the likes of Latin American countries who struggle enormouslywith women reaching significant positions of power, despite their large presencein parliament. This is due to the fact that until women are at the heart ofdecision making committees or are privy to the highest levels of power, currentgender quotas will be relatively ineffective at solving the problem ofrepresentation on the basis that despite the increased descriptiverepresentation caused by gender quotas it does little to allow women to risesignificant positions of power as this route is often blocked by genderedinstitutional practices, norms and values. On a further note, the wayin which quotas are executed in different countries is enormously influentialregarding how they solve the problem of representation. Therefore, suggestingthat the extent of which quotas are successful in solving the problem ofwomen’s underrepresentation is dependent on the nature of their implementation.Friedanvall and Dahlerup, have highlighted this argument by stating that“historical jumps in women’s representation can be achieved by many other meansbesides quotas…and reversely, quotas do not always result in increasedrepresentation” (2005). The effectiveness of quotas in terms of substantiveinterests depends on this. For example, if women are elected via the ‘fasttrack’ (Dahlerup & Friedanvall, 2005) with quotas being implemented immediately,then although their descriptive representation may increase dramatically, it mayhave very little effect on women’s empowerment and substantive representation ifthese women do not have a strong support network or power base to fall back on.This argument is furthered by Krook who emphasised the importance ofmass-mobilisation and the role of the public/private divide in the impact ofquotas (2010). This proves that quotas do not automatically lead to theempowerment and further representation of women if elected via the fast track.Dahlerup and Friedanvall conclude that critical acts are central to tacklingthe problem of women’s substantive representation (2005). A way of solving thiswould be to ensure that quotas are introduced alongside the removal of culturalbarriers, with women’s organisations working with parliaments to educate thosein the executive about the importance of women’s interests; thereby assistingin solving the problem of women’s substantive representation alongside increasingtheir descriptive representation. This incremental change has proved to behugely successful in countries such as Sweden; whose women are represented bothdescriptively and substantively; with studies proving that their input hasimproved the quality of the Swedish parliament (Dahelrup & Fridanvall,2005). Whilst being a slower and more gradual process, it would prevent women’srepresentation being purely symbolic, allowing to create real and meaningfulchange; on the basis that quotas alone are relatively limited in solving theproblem of women’s representation without the discourse from outsideinstitutions or the support of those in power positions within parliament. In addition to this, the useof quotas alone is not enough to solve the problem of representation, as theirsuccess is governed by their design and how they fit into the current electoralsystem. This is highlighted by Schwindt-Bayer who stated that “the quota’seffectiveness depends on their design” (2011). Indeed, whilst quotas themselvesprovide the theoretical foundation to solve the problem of women’sunderrepresentation via critical mass theory, they are limited without theimplementation of a wide variety of other factors. A key example of such afactor would be using sanctions to enforce the quota. The most effective ofwhich see electoral authorities banning the lists of non-complying parties ifthey do not have an appropriate number of women (Kenny, 2015); this has beenseen in the case of Belgium which has a gender quota law of 50%, withnon-complying parties being refused by the electoral authorities (Friedenvall& Dahlerup, 2013). Belgium currently has 38% of women in its Parliament(IPU, 2017), in comparison to the likes of Indonesia, which despite a 30% quotaimplementation, only 11% of its legislature is made up of women(Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). This therefore proves that the singular use of quotasis not sufficient in solving problems of women’s representation as it requiresthe assistance of outside factors for quotas to be fully effective. In additionto this, the type of electoral system can also have a strong impact on theeffectiveness of quotas, this has been highlighted by Walters who stated: “electoral systems are really drivingthe change in the effectiveness of quotas” (2015); again, proving that quotas arereliant on a host of other factors to be successful. It is often stated thatquotas work best when implemented in a PR system with high party districtmagnitudes and a closed-list, allowing parties to place women in electablepositions (Jones, 1999). This has been seen in countries such as Bolivia inwhich 1/3 positions must be occupied by a woman (Jones, 1999). In contrast tothis, Brazil, despite having a 30% gender quota implemented, women only make up10.7% of the lower house and 14.8% of the Senate (IPU, 2017). This is partlydue to the open-list PR system used in Brazil which is more individualised(Miguel, 2008) and therefore allows voters to root for specific candidates.This reinforces the statement by Schwindt-Bayer arguing that success of quotasis heavily reliant on their design (2011), as quotas systems which areimplemented with closed-list, PR systems with high district party magnitudesare more successful in solving the problems of women’s descriptive underrepresentationthan those who operate under a majoritarian system or PR systems which operatewith an open-list system with low district party magnitudes. This is on thebasis that these systems allow for a more individualist and personableelectoral system, lacking compatibility with quotas, proving that the design ofthe electoral system is paramount to a quota’s success. Consequently, whilst itwould be wrong to dismiss quotas as completely ineffective in solving theproblems of women’s underrepresentation within politics; it is true that theyare heavily reliant on the individual design, implementation and culturalfactors of a country. This is demonstrated through the varying successes thatquotas have had worldwide, with some countries improving at a faster rate thanothers. Therefore, quotas are severely limited in solving the problem ofwomen’s underrepresentation alone; what is necessary for quotas to reach theirfull potential are strong enforcement methods, an open-list PR system with highdistrict party magnitudes and finally an attitude of cultural equality withinsociety. The latter being the hardest to achieve but could be accomplished viainternational pressures, a mobilisation of women’s groups within civil societyand more comprehensive public education on the difference that women can makeif allowed to have a significant voice in policy decision making processes. Weare already seeing this sort of success in countries such as Rwanda, Sweden andBelgium in which women’s groups within civil society is becoming increasinglyinfluential in working with parliaments. Consequently, if this is achieved,gender quotas will be able to execute substantial strides in solving theproblem of women’s underrepresentation within politics. However, presently,quotas are viewed as a simple solution to an extremely complex problem.References and Bibliography:Bacchi, C., 2006, Arguingfor and against gender quotas: theoretical issues. In Dahlerup, D., 2006, Women, Quotas and Politics, United Kingdom:Routledge. 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Available from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS [Accessed 16 December 2017].Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more