A powerful politician falsely asserts that his critics among the media are purveyors of ‘fake news’. Could such assertions undermine freedom of speech?’In order to assess whether the assertions like that of the politician undermine freedom of speech, one first needs to assess what the point or justification of a freedom of speech principle is. Accordingly, I shall approach this essay in the following manner. First, I shall make two assumptions about the reach and impact of the politician’s assertion. Secondly, I shall examine two consequentialist arguments that seek to justify free speech and assess whether, according to these, such assertions can undermine free speech. Having pointed out that both of these arguments mean that a free speech principle only covers certain types of speech, it will then be considered whether one can ever say that an argument seeking to justify a freedom of speech principle is the ‘best’ or ‘right’ one. It will ultimately be concluded that one’s argument for a freedom of speech principle depends on one’s politics and values. Therefore, whether assertions like the politician’s undermine freedom of speech depends on how one argues to justify a freedom of speech principle, which in turn depends on one’s politics and values. The assertionIn the above question a ‘powerful politician falsely asserts that his critics among the media are purveyors of ‘fake news’. For the purpose of this essay, I will make two assumptions in regard to this. Firstly, that the politician’s assertion that his or her media critics are spreading ‘fake news’ is a public one, and thereby conveyed to a significant number of the voting population.  Secondly, that some of those who hear his assertion believe it to be true or at least are caused to have some doubt about the reliability and truthfulness of the media critics in question.  In addition to these assumptions, it should also be noted at the outset that the politician’s assertions are described as false, meaning his critics in the media are not in fact purveying fake news.Freedom of SpeechFor the purpose of this essay, I shall useBarendt’s definition of freedom of speech principle as ‘a principleunder which speech is entitled to special protection from regulation orsuppression’[1]. Thereare many issues and questions that arise from this. What exactly constitutesspeech? Does suppression include acts such as speakers being banned from universitycampuses? However, here I am primarily concerned with the justification or anargument for a freedom of speech principle.  In other words, why should speech be givenspecial protection? This is because, as mentioned above, to ascertain whethersomething undermines freedom of speech, one must ascertain what the point orpurpose of the freedom of speech principle is in the first place. For example,the Law faculty implements a rule banning students wearing trainers inside ofit. The justification of this is to make their students look smarter. Thestudents begin wearing flip-flops instead, and the ban in thereby undermined asthe point of it has been undermined and thwarted. Below I shall examine twojustifications for a freedom of speech. This is by no means an exhaustive list,but seeks to comprehensively examine two principle theories in the spaceavailable. The argument from self-government and democracy This justification for a free speechprinciple is based on Meiklejohn’s work[2].His argument is as follows.  He says thata self-governing society is one in which the rulers and ruled are the samepeople. In this society, men and women are politically free because they are‘governed-by themselves’[3]. Hegoes on to argue that freedom of speech is necessary in a self-governingsociety. Here, while speech can be abridged, freedom of speech cannot[4].Meiklejohn gives the example of a town hall meeting as self-government in insimplest form. All are welcome to come, all are political equals and all have aright and duty to their own thoughts and to express these thoughts because freedomof speech must not be abridged[5].However, to open and continue the meeting by way of using a chairman to quietthe crowd and to choose those to speak, speech must be abridged. This isbecause, according to Meiklejohn, what is essential for the purpose of freedomof speech is ‘not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth sayingshall be said’[6]. Allsides of an argument must be heard, because for a society to be self-governing,the men and women in that society must judge ideas and proposals forthemselves. Others must not do it for them. Therefore, for Meiklejohn, thejustification or point of a freedom of speech is principle is that it is necessaryin order to have, support and promote a self-governing, democratic society. However, there are several things to noteabout this argument.  Firstly, it isincredibly narrow in scope as the argument only applies for a freedom of speechprinciple in ‘self-governing society’. Schauer points out that this theory is‘contingent upon one particular theory of government’[7].This is a valid point. Meiklejohn’s justification of freedom of speech, even ifsound, is only applicable to democratic political institutions. Yet, a freedomof speech principle can exist and indeed, may be useful, in societies which arenot self-governing. Even a society governed by a tyrant may have a reason forfreedom of speech. For example, a tyrant may want to build a new railway so wantsa public consultation or meeting on the best way to do so. This would be hisversion of Meiklejohn town hall. He or she may do this in order to garner andmaintain public support for said railway, but also to ascertain the best methodof building the railway. Secondly, this argument would only mean evenwithin democratic societies only a small range of speech would be protected.This is because this argument for a freedom of speech principle means that, asBarendt points out, the principle would only cover political expression[8]. Schauerwrites that under Meiklejohn’s theory freedom of speech would need to beprotected for two main reasons[9].Firstly, so the electorate can be provided with the information need toexercise its power and make intelligent decisions. Secondly, so they cancriticize government officials and hold them to account.  Yet, in many democratic societies protectionis afforded to non-political speech. For example, hate speech, pornography andart. Neither of these fall within the two reasons described previously. Theelectorate would not need to hear or use malicious racial abuse in order tomake decisions or criticize politicians.  Nor, as Barendt points out[10],would speech that advocated for a change in the governance of society beprotected, for example, a movement from a democracy to a socialist republic. Therefore,this justification for a freedom of speech principle is narrow in what speechit covers and does not provide any reason for the principle applying topornography, art and political speech advocating alternatives to democracies atit often does in liberal democracies. A third point can be made about thisjustification. If a democratic self-governing society is the basis for a freespeech principle, then democratic agents of that society surely should be ableto regulate free speech? Indeed, as Barendt points out, a government may thinkthe the values of self-governing society can best be preserved by suppressingfree speech.[11] Schauerargues that ‘the very notion of popular sovereignty supporting the argumentfrom democracy argues against any limitation on that sovereignty, and therebyargues against recognition of an independent principle of freedom of speech’[12].This is an important point. For a democratic society to be trulyself-governing, there cannot be limits on their ability to self-govern.Therefore, to be truly self-governing they cannot be prohibited from legislatingto regulate or prohibit some speech. Taking this to be thejustification of a free speech principle, it must now be considered whether acry of ‘fake news’ in the context above undermines this version of the freespeech principle. A helpful way to do so is by using Meiklejohn’s town hallanalogy. A woman is chosen to speak in the town hall making a truthfulcriticism of a town member who is a prominent politician. After she hasconcluded, a cry of ‘fake news’ from this powerful politician, leads many inthe room to believe her speech to be false, essentially making anything shesays redundant. Her cry may be ‘heard’ by the other town members, but it issoon disregarded. They have not heard any substantive rebuttals from theprominent businessman, but have instead rejected the woman’s ideas. Does thisundermine a freedom of speech principle that is justified by the aboveargument? Not necessarily. This is because the criticisms that he calls ‘fakenews’ may not be anything to do with politics. They may be claims about hisprivate life and habits that he is attempting to silence. For his call of ‘fakenews’ to undermine this conception of freedom of speech, the politician wouldneed to be calling political speech ‘fake news’. Moreover, he would need to doso in a self-governing, democratic society, rather than another form ofsociety. Therefore, for the politician’s assertion of ‘fake news’ would onlyundermine freedom of speech if they were said in a democratic self-governingsociety and were directed towards political speech.The argument from truth and knowledge. This argument is based on Mill’s work in hisbook, On Liberty[13].Mill’s view is that the justification of a free speech principle is to secureand promote knowledge. He sets out the argument as follows for why opinions, bethey true of false, should not be suppressed in the following way. Firstly, inregard to a right or true opinion, if this is suppressed the human race isdenied the opportunity to correct their own erroneous views. There is always achance that opinion which an authority tries to suppress may be true and torefuse to ever hear the opinion ‘assumes our own infallibility’[14].  Secondly, if the wrong opinion is silenced,the human race is denied the opportunity to gain a clearer view of the truth,which would be produced when they it collided with the erroneous opinion. This,Mill says, is because even if the the silenced opinion is wrong it may containa portion of the truth. The prevailing opinion rarely contains the whole truth,and we can only find the remainder of the truth by way of the clash ofdifferent opinions. This is why we have opposition parties to the party inpower in politics. Thirdly, even if the prevailing, received opinion is thewhole truth, without opposition it will be held as a prejudice. People willhave no understanding of its rational grounds. Fourthly, people will lose any real belief or heartfelt conviction inthese true received opinions if there is no opposition. The opinion becomes a‘dead dogma’[15]. Therefore,for Mill, the justification for a freedom of speech principle is that itpromotes and secures knowledge. The suppression of both right and wrongopportunity denies humans the opportunity to promote and secure knowledge andtruth. Again, there are several points to be madeabout this argument as a justification of freedom of speech. Firstly, as withthe above argument, this one too only has a limited breadth. Barendt points outthat this argument would likely not cover speech that does not ‘assert anycoherent proposition or make a claim which could ever be objectively tested’[16].For example, a statement of personal abuse such as ‘this person is the ugliestman who has ever existed’.  This is notnecessarily a weakness, but does mean the breadth of the principle is narrowedin a similar way to how a free speech principle based on the argument fromdemocracy only applies to political speech. It also, as Barendt says, fails toexplain protection that is given to personal abuse and pornography in manysocieties[17].Moreover, there are weaknesses in theargument itself. Firstly, Barendt argues that Mill’s argument can be criticisedbecause of its assumption that publicising possible true opinions is ‘thehighest public good’[18].Barendt makes a convincing case for his criticism. Many societies decide othervalues are more important and protect them accordingly. For example, banninghomophobic or racial hate speech. This is because the societies in question areprioritising equality and sensitivities above absolute freedom of speech. Barendtsays that a government is entitled to prioritise ‘public order considerations’over the development of knowledge, in cases where it is worried thatinflammatory speech may cause disorder[19].Indeed, Schauer points out that some opinions are suppressed for reasonsunrelated to their truth or falsity[20].For example, of an experiment which results shows that men are marginallybetter than women at a specific game. The results are suppressed as it isfeared that sexists will place too much prominence on their results. Of course,I accept there will be times when publishing true opinions is deemed to be thehighest public good. Yet, Mill is wrong to assume that this will always be thecase.  In addition to this. Barendt points out thatMill makes an assumption that that freedom of speech necessarily leads to thediscovery of truth and the bettering of knowledge[21].While, Barendt says, this may be true in learning environments likeuniversities, it is hard to say the same about the whole of society. This is afair criticism. Humans, as Mill himself is keen to point out, are notinfallible. There is nothing to suggest that given both sides of an argument, ahuman would always reach the ‘true’ or ‘right’ conclusion. Indeed, historyshows this not to be the case. Barendt gives the example of the Nazis coming topower in Germany, despite there being ‘relatively free political discourse’prior to their election[22].Therefore, it is not clear that just because all opinions are heard that thetruth will necessarily be discovered.Taking this to be the justification of a freespeech principle, it must now be considered whether a cry of ‘fake news’ in thecontext above undermines this version of the free speech principle. Thequestion states that the politician ‘falsely asserts’ that his critics arepurveying ‘fake news’ (i.e. their criticisms are true) and an assumption ofthis essay is that a significant number of people believe this cry of ‘fakenews’ to be true.  It can therefore beargued that the powerful politician is effectively ‘suppressing’ a rightopinion, or the truth. The citizens over which he provides are not getting thethe chance to correct their erroneous views. Free speech is undermined.However, this would only be the case if the criticisms related to a claim thatcould be objectively tested. As the question states that the politician‘falsely’ states that his critics are spreading ‘fake news’ it is likely inthis case that they are making claims that can be objectively tested. Forexample, the size of a crowd at a politician’s speech. Which argument for a free speech principle, if any, is the ‘right’ one? Taking into account the above, it seems thatthere are two determining factors in working out whether the politician’sassertions undermine freedom of speech. Firstly, what argument one uses tojustify a freedom of speech principle and secondly, what the criticisms thatthat the politician calls ‘fake news’ relate to. If one uses the argument fromdemocracy and self-governance, if the criticisms relate to political expressionthen the cries of ‘fake news’ will undermine freedom of speech. If one uses theargument from truth and knowledge, if the criticisms could be objectivelytested then the cries of ‘fake news’ would undermine freedom of speech. For theabove reasoning, it seems likely that his critics are making such criticisms. Toanswer the essay question more concretely, one would ideally be able toidentify one of the many arguments for a free speech principle as the ‘best’ or‘right’ one. However, as shown above, both arguments that I have highlightedhave their weaknesses. The argument from democracy and self-government does notaddress the problem that for a society to be truly self-governing, there cannotbe any limits on their sovereignty, such as a free speech principle preventingthem from regulating speech. The argument from truth wrongly assumes that truthwill always be the highest value public good and that the availability of allthe opinions will cause the truth to be discovered.  From the above, it would be difficult toconclude that there is a single justification for a freedom of speechprinciple, from which we could decide whether or not the politician’sassertions undermined free speech. Other theories justify a freedom of speechprinciple on the basis of securing and promoting human dignity and equality[23],or autonomy[24]. These,however, are not free from criticism either.[25]It is therefore difficult for one to say which argument for a free speechprinciple is the ‘best’ or ‘right’ one, and in turn difficult to say whether ornot the politician’s assertions would undermine freedom of speech. An explanation for this difficulty can befound in the work of Stanley Fish who famously declares that there is ‘no suchthing as free speech’[26].His argument is that freedom of speech is ‘not an independent value, but apolitical prize’[27]. Thereis no ‘natural content’ to freedom of speech[28].Instead, it is given a content that serves the political purpose of the personinvoking it. Freedom of speech, for Fish, is not a general principle but oneunderstood by the exclusions that give it its meaning. For example, saying allspeech is tolerated apart from that which which promotes Nazism. It is theexclusion of speech promoting Nazism that gives freedom of speech its meaninghere. It is what remains when one has decided what types of speech are notallowed. The value of a freedom of speech principle is thereby produced by itsexceptions. Fish’s argument can be further demonstrated by using the argumentset out above that the justification of a free speech principle is to promotetruth. Fish argues that by specifying a good here (truth), one can then arguethat a particular form of speech may undermine the realisation of this good[29].For example, speech encouraging the establishment of a tyranny, or speechdeliberately intended to prevent one reaching the truth – these are theexceptions. These exceptions and the line drawn between what speech isacceptable and what should be regulated are in turn influenced by one’spolitics.  A free speech principle cantherefore have no objective natural content (i.e. seeking to promote knowledgeand truth), instead the principle will reflect the political views of theperson espousing it.  Fish states thatthis is because for consequentialists free speech means ‘free speech so long asit does not subvert our core values’.[30]Yet it is perhaps too strong to conclude thatthere is no such thing as no such thing as free speech. Rather, I would suggestthat there is no objective free speech principle. There is no ‘right’ or betterjustification for a free speech principle. It is better to conclude that one’sconception of a free speech principle will ultimately depend on one’s valuesand politics. This explains the reason that a freedom of speech principle isinvoked in so many different contexts in modern day society. Whether the politician’sassertions undermine or do not undermine free speech will depend on what onebelieves the justification of a free speech principle to be. This in turndepends upon one’s core values (democracy, truth and knowledge, autonomy etc)which is a political choice. It does not mean that there is ‘no such thing asfree speech’, but that a free speech principle does not have a fixed content orjustification as one’s conception of free speech will ultimately depend onone’s views and politics. Therefore, it is impossible to give a concrete yes orno answer as to whether the politician’s assertions undermine freedom ofspeech. Instead, this will depend on how an individual chooses to justify afreedom of speech principle.  ConclusionIn conclusion, whether an assertion by apowerful politician that his critics among the media are purveyors of ‘fakenews’ undermines free speech or not, depends upon what one thinks to be thejustification of a free speech principle. This is in turn dependent on one’spolitical views and values. Accordingly, a free speech principle has noobjective content and it cannot be said for certain whether cries of ‘fakenews’ like that of the politician will undermine free speech. For example, ifone chooses the argument from democracy and self-government, then the cry of‘fake news’ will undermine free speech if the criticisms being made werepolitical ones. Whereas, if one chooses the argument from truth and knowledge,then the cry of ‘fake news’ will likely undermine free speech. [1] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 7[2] Alexander Meiklejohn, FreeSpeech and its Relation to Self-Government, (Harper 1948) ch1 [3] Alexander Meiklejohn, FreeSpeech and its Relation to Self-Government, (Harper 1948) 16[4] Alexander Meiklejohn, FreeSpeech and its Relation to Self-Government, (Harper 1948) 19.[5] Alexander Meiklejohn, FreeSpeech and its Relation to Self-Government, (Harper 1948) 22.[6] Alexander Meiklejohn, FreeSpeech and its Relation to Self-Government, (Harper 1948) 25.[7] Frederik Schauer, Free Speech: aphilosophical enquiry, (CUP 1982) 35.[8] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 18. [9] Frederik Schauer, Free Speech: aphilosophical enquiry, (CUP 1982) 36. [10] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 19. [11] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 19. [12] Frederik Schauer, Free Speech: aphilosophical enquiry, (CUP 1982) 41. [13] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (firstpublished 1859, CUP 1989), ch2. [14] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (firstpublished 1859, CUP 1989), 53. [15] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (firstpublished 1859, CUP 1989), 37. [16] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 10.[17] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 10. [18] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 8. [19] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 9. [20] Frederik Schauer, Free Speech: aphilosophical enquiry, (CUP 1982) 23. [21] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 9. [22] Eric Barendt, Freedomof Speech, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 9.[23] Ronald Dworkin,Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard1996), ch8. [24] Thomas Scanlon, ‘Freedom of Expression andCategories of Expression’, (1979) 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev 519[25] See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2ndedn, OUP 2007) 14-16. [26] Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As FreeSpeech, and it’s a good thing too (OUP, 1994) 90.[27] Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As FreeSpeech, and it’s a good thing too (OUP, 1994) 90. [28] Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As FreeSpeech, and it’s a good thing too (OUP, 1994) 90. [29] Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As FreeSpeech, and it’s a good thing too (OUP, 1994) 19.[30] Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing As FreeSpeech, and it’s a good thing too (OUP, 1994) 19.Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more