Does the existenceof nuclear weaponry increase peace and stability in the international system? 1.    IntroductionIn which ways does the existence of nuclear weaponry increase peace and stability in the international system? This essay argues both for and against the nuclear peace hypothesis, otherwise known as the nuclear deterrence theory. It will draw on quantitative dyadic-based evidence from Robert Rauchhaus’s’ study published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2009, which finds support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. This in term explains that while nuclear weapons do in fact provide a nuclear peace in some examples, which promotes strategic stability and prevents major wars, it also allows for more frequent, lower intensity conflicts. Included will be the arguments and point of views from both deterrence optimists, pessimists and on-the-fence scholars, as well as providing specific examples and case studies, predominantly the Cold War.2.    Nuclear Peace HypothesisThe Nuclear Peace Theory is an internationalrelations theory that argues that the presence of nuclear weapons inducesstability and decreases the chance of major conflict under some circumstances. Thelack of a third war following the second was said to have been induced bynuclear stability during the Cold War. This was said to have been caused by themutual possession of second strike retaliation by the two powers of that war,the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR), which eliminated thepossibility of victory for either side because of Mutually Assured Destruction,or the MAD doctrine (Lieber & Press, 2016). Second strike abilityis considered vital to nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the opposition could attemptto win the war by striking first. Mutual second-strike capabilities generallycause a mutually assured destruction defense strategy but is possible that onestate has a lower minimal deterrence strategy. Lower minimal deterrence is whena state possesses only what is necessary to be able to reciprocate second strike (Long & Green, 2014) . This doctrine was pursuedby China and India when the US and the USSR were developing powerful first and second-strikeabilities during the Cold War (Jones, 2001). The Nuclear Peace Hypothesisis criticized by scholars as proliferation of states increases the chance oflow-intensity interstate conflict, but also the chance of nuclear materialbeing procured by violent groups such as terrorist group Al Qaeda, who are exemptfrom the threat of nuclear retaliation as they are stateless (Sagan S. , 1994). 2.1. Proliferation optimists and pessimistsWhy have therebeen no major wars between great powers in the last 6 decades? The three leadingtheories in IR have offered their own answers and views on this question. Neoliberalismis most cited- Advancing Kant’s perpetual peace theory (1795), neo liberalshave surmised the foundation of this peace to be built upon democracy (Moaz & Russet, 1993), trade (Keohane & Nye, 1977) and internationalorganisations (Keohane,2015) (Rauchhaus,Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis, 2009). Constructivistpoint of view is somewhat in line with that of the (neo) liberalist’s, but itcredits the Long Peace to the social constructs within a state and society,such as normative behaviour and actions. Neorealism, the third leading theory,has a completely different approach and attributes the peace to nucleardeterrence and bipolarity (Seepersad, 2011) (Waltz, 1990). Even though nucleardeterrence is one of the main facets of realist consideration for Long Peace,not much research has been done into proving why exactly it does. Most of thestudies done have been focused on nuclear weapons and crises, or nuclearweapons and conflict escalation (Rauchhaus, 2009). There is no debateabout whether nuclear weapons decrease the chance of war, as when both states posses’nuclear weapons they do decrease thechance of major war. However, what has not been widely discussed is that theydo not decrease the chance of civil, periphery and small wars, which still causesthe expenditure of wealth, resources and lives. Proliferationoptimists, such as Kenneth Waltz (1990) and John Lewis Gaddis (1992), hypothesisethat the reason that there has not been a third world war, despite the secondfollowing the first within twenty years, and the Cold War right after that, isbecause of the Nuclear Deterrence Theory. Because of the absolute destructivityof nuclear weapons, even the least intelligent of leaders can understand thatusing them would be disadvantageous for everyone involved, thus there are nowars. Proliferationcritics are described as those who hold diametrically opposed views. They do nodeny that nuclear deterrence discourages major wars but safety, rational andmoral critics believe that the deterrent value outweighs the possibility ofnegating war. The shared view is that nuclearizing states, such as the South ofAsia, could lead to inadvertent escalation, or further proliferation onunstable nations (Sagan S. , 1994). Safety criticssuch as Scott Sagan (1993), argue that thepossibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist statelessgroups or accidental detonation or exchange during the war, are too big of asafety concern, and so overwhelm the positive presence of them possiblyaverting WWIII (Sagan S. D., 1993). Rationality critics such as Bob Jervis are not being critical ofthe underlying logic nuclear deterrence, but rather of deterrence failure aspeople are not perfectly rational beings, and mistakes can be made (Jervis, 1989). Moral critics suchas Richard Falk (1991) argue that nuclear weapons violate international law,and are immoral, but do not argue against whether nuclear weapons actually makewar less likely. One of the scholarsviewed as being the most opposed to the nuclear peace theory is John Mueller, however,if the reader were to go through his books in detail, they would learn thatthey haven’t denied that nuclear weapons do not help enforce the current peace.He says that the lack of World War III and the cause of Long Peace isattributed to education, changing norms and interdependence (betweenstates), and that he believes that WWIII would not have happened, despitenuclear weapons, but he does not deny they helped enforce peace (Mueller, 1988).As the reader has possibly gleaned by now,and will realise by theend of this essay, Nuclear Peace is not a simple matter and as we continue,proliferation pessimists and optimist’s groups have some of each of theirclaims verified. In favour of proliferation optimists, the possession ofnuclear weaponry by both states does decrease the possibility of major war, andthis can possibly be explained in Snyder’s essay on the stability-instabilityparadox. However, pessimists can justify most of their claims hereafter, as ifthere is an imbalance with one state possessing and the other not, there is anincreased likelihood of war. Additionally, looking at this holistically, thepossession or creation of nuclear weapons are closely associated with increasedconflict, casualties and clashes, however all at a lower intensity. Thissupports Snyder’s previously mentioned stability-instability theory, whichsuggests a link between nuclear perceived peace and increased lower-intensityconflicts, which is further supported by Rauchhaus’s Nuclear PeaceHypothesis (2009).3.    Stability Instability ParadoxNeither pessimistic nor optimistic of proliferation,there is a group of scholars who believe that nuclear weapons tend to promotepeace between states that both have Nuclear Weapons, but do not create peaceoverall. The international relations theory behind their belief is thestability instability paradox (Krepon, 2005), that two statesunderstand that if they had a major war between them, then it would be thepreviously mentioned Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). However, becauseeither state is aware that the other state is aware of this, and there is anunspoken threshold that they won’t go beyond in terms of aggravation, then thecollective agreement leads to small wars, proxy wars or periphery wars, and notallowing any of these conflicts to escalate to nuclear warfare. An example ofthis is during the Cold War, the powers of that war (US and the USSR) neverengaged directly through warfare, but engaged indirectly through proxy andminor wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan among others, and used largeamount of resources and manpower to regain the upper hand over one another. Support of this theory was seen in RobertRauchhaus’s quantitative study in 2009, Evaluating the Nuclear PeaceHypothesis, which builds on the dyadically analysed Democratic PeaceTheory, and includes controls to search for nuclear only inclusive conflicts. Workingin symmetrical and asymmetrical variables (asymmetrical being one state hasnuclear weapons, and the other being symmetrical) he includes regressionanalysis[1]that controls the study for nuclear weapons only, so the results only showconflicts between states that include nuclear weapons. His results are quiteinteresting, as they show that in every case where nuclear weapons areincluded, they are associated with an increase in all types of conflict;militarized, aggressive force used and fatalities between all countries, andwar between asymmetric dyads (one state possessing nuclear weapons and theother not). Although the results state thatnuclear weapons bring conflict, they do include the exception that there are nodirect wars between the two countries involved if they both possess nuclearweapons, although there is a high probability of minor or indirect conflictsbetween them.  The assumptions of the connection between MADand the stability instability paradox is that as a consequence of thistruce-like behaviour, actors will be rational and will apply that rationality tohow they manage conflicts and the ultimate goal being the avoidance of nuclearwarfare, and thus, destruction. However, although logical, this might not bethe case on the international relations stage, as some nations could have thebelief that life after death is a big improvement than the current life we are livingand will attempt to aid a swift transition to the ‘afterlife’. This would thenbe perfectly rational to them, but not to many other nations, who arepredominantly atheist (Harris, 2005). 4.    ConclusionNuclear weapons went from being viewed asinstruments of Apocalypses, to a form of reassurance, deterrence andnegotiation. They have been viewed as either a good or a bad force for a longtime, but the reality of the situation as seen in the discussion above, is thatnuclear weapons are in fact a very complex and bipolar topic. Although they doencourage a sort of peaceful truce between countries both holdings nuclearweapons in regard to major wars, there is a proven increase in lower intensitywars between those states, and so can one really call that peace? Do thesmaller war casualties get counted towards this truce or are these numbersdisregarded in comparison to the damage that would be done by nuclear bombing?In comparison, if there is an asymmetry then there is a great chance of disputeand war from the side with the nuclear weapon. When these theories arecombined, the stability instability paradox has been explained and supported. This essay has demonstrated my beliefs thatalthough nuclear weapons prevent major wars, it does not create peace in thetypical sense, as the peace described is rather a tense and precariousagreement to cease fire, with many smaller and still detrimental wars still occurring.If one had to really call this type of truce peace, then it would be peacebuilt on fear, distrust and hatred, which is not really peace at all. It would be interesting to have further research done in nuclear weaponry and peace having a correlation.  It would be intriguing to examine potential intended consequence when states try to acquire nuclear weapons, and the possibility of their opposition (or other concerned states) going to war with them to prevent that. More simply put, if the proliferation process itself has the possibility to drive further conflict. A modern case study would be Iran trying to access/research nuclear weapons, and states negative response to that. Another interesting direction a study could take could be theoretically discuss what the outcome would be if nuclear weapons were to be banned, and if humans would invent a new horror in the form of DNA affecting biological warfare? ReferencesGaddis, J. L. (1986). The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System. International Security, 10(4), 99-142. doi:10.2307/2538951.Gaddis, J. L. (1992). The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future. Diplomatic History, 16(2), 234-246. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24912152Harris, S. (2005). The end of faith: Religion, terror, and the future of reason. W. W. Nortan & Company.Jervis, R. (1989). Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence. World Politics, 41(2), 183-207. doi:doi:10.2307/2010407Jones, R. W. (2001). Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. Reston, VA: Policy Architects International. Retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/south_asia.pdfKeohane, R. O. (2015, October 2). After Hegemony: Cooperation is Still Possible. The International Spectator, 50(4), 92-94. doi:10.1080/03932729.2015.1079683Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition. Boston: Little, Brown.Krepon, M. (2005, January 1). The Stability-Instability Paradox, Miscperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia. SITREP, 65(1). Retrieved from https://www.stimson.org/content/stability-instability-paradox-south-asiaLieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2016). The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Conflict. Strategic Studies Quaterly, 10(5), 31-42. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271621Long, A., & Green, B. R. (2014, December 24). 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The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. International Security, 18(4), 66-107.Sagan, S. D. (1993). The limits of safety: Organizations, accidents, and nuclear weapons. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.Seepersad, D.-M. (2011, February 17). The politics of bipolarity and IPE in contemporary times. E-International Relations Students, n/a. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/17/the-politics-of-bipolarity-and-ipe-in-contemporary-times/Waltz, K. N. (1990, September 1). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review, 84(3), 731-745. doi:10.2307/1962764Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social constuction of power politics. International Organization , 46(2), 291-425. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764Yost, D. S. (2003). Debating Security Strategies. Nato Review(4).[1] These are described by him as Control Variables and include tradeindependence, distance, continuity, power/capabilities, alliance partners,major power status, democracy, trade/interdependence and IGO membership. Theseare used to isolate the effects of nuclear weapons and come to as accurate ananswer as possible (Rauchhaus,2009).Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more