IntroductionOpinions regarding the Arab – Israeli conflict can be complex and multidimensional. Just within a country there exists varying levels of opinion. These include individual sentiments, institutional views, and normally an official foreign policy. Moreover, opinions on the conflict may be influenced by numerous factors such as; economics, religious/ethnic background, or morals. In a case such as the Arab – Israeli conflict, a significant question a country ponders when determining their foreign policy includes: what is there to gain or lose from taking a certain position? Further, they may ask: what position can be taken to maximize beneficial outcomes for our country? The term for this theoretical approach to foreign policy making is called “realism.” A core tenant of realism is concerned with achieving national interests, which essentially are a country’s goals and ambitions whether economic, military, increased influence, etc.[1]In this paper, myaim is to examine the many approaches Canada has taken towards the Arab –Israeli conflict. To specify, this paper chronologically observes Canada’s evolvingforeign policy from 1939 to 2014. Further, I argue that for the majority ofthis time, Canada’s foreign policy towards the conflict has been dictated byrealism, or achieving Canadian national interests. There was a distinct shiftin foreign policy during the years Paul Martin and Stephen Harper stood asPrime Minister. Rather than following Canada’s official position, they allowedpersonal values to dictate the Canadian approach; ultimately to the detrimentof national interests. The paper concludes with my take on how the currentLiberal should approach the conflict given the current turbulent state ofaffairs.StructureFirst however, itis important for contextual purposes to understand the structure of this paper.In addition to being chronological, the paper follows another pattern that methodicallyillustrates Canada’s approaches towards the conflict. In each section, aparticular time period is specified. Each time period represents a new approach,in which the particular national interest(s) of that time are defined. Inconjunction with the definition, the paper shows how each approach, inpractice, served the national interest. There are three of these sections: 1939– 1947, 1948 – 1967, and 1968 – 2003. While remainingexplanatory in nature, the paper deviates slightly from the pattern startingwith the shift in foreign policy during the Martin – Harper years (2004 – 2015).In the fourth section, the suspected reasoning for the change in approach is explained,followed by how it negatively affected the country. The final section consistsof normative analysis. I briefly outline the current state of the Arab –Israeli conflict, while offering the reader how I believe the Canadiangovernment should approach it.1939 – 1947: Canadian Hesitancy During the SecondWorld War, Canada displayed its effectiveness as a middle power ally of Westernforces. The existing superpower of Britain, as well as the emerging superpowerUnited States, recognized Canadian war efforts. As a result, theirinternational standing began to rise. Using this reputable status, Canadadedicated itself to the United Nations (UN).[2] Evenas a middle power, the UN allowed Canada to have above average influence in theinternational sphere. Furthermore, it was Prime Minster (PM) Mackenzie King’sbelief that it was in the Canadian national interest to maintain good relationswith both the United States and Great Britain.[3] Sohow does this relate to the Arab – Israeli conflict? Shortly after theSecond World War ended, Britain, who had largely been handling the ongoing Arab– Israeli conflict, handed control over to the United Nations.[4] Indoing so, this created the first instance whereby Canada was obliged to have anopinion regarding the conflict. Meanwhile. the post-war government consideredthe conflict to be insignificant in terms of directly affecting Canadianforeign policy. During this time, Canada had little economic or strategic tiesto the Israeli’s and Arab countries. Moreover, Canada’s economy, while budding,was not particularly robust; making any commitments to the conflict anunnecessary financial burden. Nevertheless, Canadahad a vested interest in appeasing the UN. When the UN called upon Canada to bean active participant in solving the crisis, Canada was hesitant, buteventually agreed to be a part of the United Nations Special Committee onPalestine (UNSCOP).[5]Canada believed that if the UN was unable to resolve this conflict, it woulddamage the credibility of the institution. By proxy, this would be detrimentalto the Canadian national interest. As mentioned, their status at the UN allowedthem to maintain their above average influence in the international sphere. Additionally,Canada’s participation in UNSCOP pleased the British. Joining UNSCOP relievedBritain of much responsibility in resolving a conflict that had cost them asignificant amount of resources in the preceding decades. Seemingly, thecost of being a participant in UNSCOP was outweighed by the perceived benefits.The national interest, according to Mackenzie King was served during this timeperiod. This shows how Canada was thrust into the conflict. Next, we look attheir original approach of impartiality. 1948 – 1967: Canada’s ImpartialityBy 1948, the UNpartition plan had taken effect. Palestine had been divided and the state ofIsrael officially created. Unfortunately, the resolution was largelyunsuccessful, as violent conflict between the two parties continued to occur.This conflict created issues that influenced Cold War spheres of influence. TheWest and East Bloc were taking sides on the Israel – Palestine conflict. Onceagain, Canada’s approach towards these issues was consistent with achievingtheir national interest.Canada’s nationalinterests did not change much from the previous time period. They remainedcommitted to maintaining good relations with the United States and GreatBritain. Along with being Canada’s largest economic partners, they alsorepresented Canada’s greatest security alliance. Counterbalancing the perceivedthreat of the Soviet Union was crucial to Canada’s existence, although it cameat a cost.The risingtensions between the West and East bloc had a negative impact on Canada, mainlyfinancially. Defence spending in Canada at the end of World War Two was roughly3 percent of the GDP, whereas during the 1950s it averaged around 6 percent.[6]Thus, it was important for Canada to lesson the Cold War tensions andcontribute to global peace to minimize the financial burden.Canada was in atough position. To achieve their national interests, they had to demonstratefull support of their Western allies while simultaneously preserving orreducing Cold War tensions. Intrinsically, those goals seemed opposite;however, Canada utilised its previously mentioned high standing with the UN toachieve their interests. They accomplished their goals through adhering to apolicy of impartiality, whichultimately shaped Canada’s perception as “an honest broker” for the conflict.[7]The following paragraphs detail examples of how Canada achieved their intereststhrough impartiality.The first exampleof impartiality is Canada’s handling of the Suez crisis, which requires some backgroundinformation. The conflict began in July 1956 when Soviet backed Egypt, seizedcontrol and nationalized the canal. This had adverse economic effects on muchof the Western Bloc, as well as Israel. Joined by the British and the French,Israeli armed forces pushed into Egypt toward the Suez Canal in October of thatyear. The Suez crisis became a hostile standoff, with international security atstake.[8] Canada’s adherenceto impartiality played a leading role in de-escalating the conflict. LesterPearson who then was the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposedthat a multinational peacekeeping force act as a buffer between the opposingsides. After being approved by the UN, Canada led a United Nations EmergencyForce to ensure both sides remained separate. This allowed for both sides towithdraw their troops without having to admit defeat, which greatly diminishedthe tensions. Lester Pearson later won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts inmediating the Suez Crisis. More importantly perhaps, this served the Canadiannational interest of reducing Cold War tensions without disrupting theircurrent alliances. Unfortunately, thiswas not the only time Canada was called upon to be impartial when it came toviolent or potentially violent conflict. As mentioned, international peace andsecurity aligned with the Canadian national interest. Through the Suez crisis,the world saw Canada as being the honest broker in the region. Thus, if Canadawas to be a meaningful contributor to international peace, and thus achievetheir national interest, they had to remain impartial to maintain “honestbroker” status. When the 6 Day Warbegan, which saw Israel launch pre-emptive strikes against Egypt, Canadadeclined Israel’s request to send aid. The requested aid did not consist of offensiveweaponry; nevertheless, Canada remained impartial for the fear of beingperceived as favouring Israel. A related example revolves around nuclearweapons. While Canada did not produce nuclear weapons for themselves, they werea leading nation in nuclear technology. To remain impartial, Canada did notprovide either the Arab nations or Israel with nuclear reactors.[9] Ineither case, if Canada had favoured one side, their advantageous perception asan honest broker would be compromised.A final example ofimpartiality displayed by Canada exists in a decision to place theCanadian-Israeli embassy in Tel Aviv rather than Jerusalem. Placing the embassyin Jerusalem would be perceived internationally as Canada legitimizing Israel’sclaim such contentious, holy land. Before JohnDiefenbaker became Prime Minister, he expressed interest in moving the embassyto Jerusalem. Facing opposition from the bureaucracy, this move never occurred as itwas considered unnecessarily controversial. Rather, External Affairs convincedthe eventual PM that impartiality was the best approach. [10] Thus, Canada continued to contribute to thepeace process as an effective mediator through the UN.As seen throughthe various forms of impartiality, Canada was able to effectively balance itscommitment to the Western Bloc, while simultaneously contributing to the peaceprocess. Particularly with the Suez Crisis, Canada reduced Cold War tensionswhich further advanced their national interest. 1968 – 2003At this time, theArab – Israeli conflict was a deadlock. Despite the ongoing efforts of the UN,peace negotiations were unsuccessful. Arab leaders had reached a consensus thatthere should be no recognition, no peace, and no negotiations with the State ofIsrael.[11]This set the context for PM Pierre Trudeau to establish a new approach towardsCanada’s gradually changing national interests.Much like theprevious time period, maintaining relatively balanced relations between boththe Arab nations and Israel was an advantageous position for Canada. Thedifference however, exists in the way Canada went about achieving said balance.Rather than be consciously impartial, Canada opened relations with both the Arab states and the Israeli’s. Trudeauwished to “extend its domestic interests abroad.”[12]This paper calls this new approach “active relations.” Let us first examine theslight changes in national interests, followed by examples of how activerelations pursued these goals.First off, it wasin this time period that Canada began considering economic relations as being afactor in foreign policy making. This required fostering ties with both sidesof the conflict. Second, appeasing the United States remained a priority in anyforeign policy decision. Keeping the United States happy meant stability forboth Canada’s economy and security. Lastly, regardless of the improbability of bringingpeace to the region, making such efforts remained beneficial to Canada. Itallowed Canada to maintain its good standing with the UN, and its reputabilityas a middle power with above average influence. It is important tonote that in achieving these national interests, they overlap when illustratingactive relations. They are not concretely separate interests. With that inmind, let us begin by illustrating active relations through economic ties andit will segue into other interests. In 1973, Canada heldits first ever meetings with various Arab representatives to officially developrelations with their countries.[13]This was in response to the effects of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Egypt and Syrialed fellow Arab nations in an attack against Israel in hopes of regainingterritory lost during the 1967 Six-days war. To reduce potential support forIsrael, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) initiated an oil embargo on Western states. As a result, Canadians werenegatively affected by the steep rise in oil prices, making good relations withArab nations increasingly important.[14] Whiletaking part in meetings exemplifies active relations, what truly solidified theapproach was Canada’s recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization(PLO) during these meetings.In similarfashion, Canada sought to establish stronger economic ties with Israel. In1976, Canada and Israel formed the Joint Economic Commission (JEC). Details onthe original JEC are limited because in 1993, the Canadian government renewedand revamped the agreement. The JEC consists of three economic goals. First,increased cooperation between Canadian and Israeli private sectors; second,facilitating specific projects or partnerships between companies that may leadto research and development; third, greater commercial and industrialrelations.[15]These examples ofeconomic ties show that Canada maintained their balanced position in theconflict. Moreover, Canada did so not through impartiality, but through activerelations with both sides. This balance was threatened in 1979 when Joe Clarkbecame PM. Like John Diefenbaker, Clark wanted to move Canada’s embassy fromTel Aviv to Jerusalem. Canada’s foreign policy makers were no longer the onlyone’s critical of Clark’s intention. There was backlash from Canadianbusinesses, as now they had significant economic ties with Arab countries.Furthermore, U.S President Jimmy Carter opposed the move as he believed itcould disrupt the recent Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement signed during theCamp David summit.[16] By once again decidingnot moving the embassy, Canada benefitted from the stability in the region,kept the United States happy, and maintained good relations with both the Arab’sand Israeli’s. To furtherillustrate how Canada used active relations, one can look at Canada’sinvolvement with the Refugee Working Group (RWG). Canada was assigned to thisrole due to its previously mentioned honest broker status. Israel stated thatthe only way it would participate in the RWG was if Canada organized it. As theChair of the RWP, Canada actively led discussions between both the PLO andIsrael to discuss the scope of the refugee issue. Unfortunately, the PLO andthe state of Israel held staunchly opposed views over the right of refugees toreturn to their homes. Thus, the goal of the RWG was to determine how best to alleviatethe anguish suffered by people displaced because of the Arab – Israeliconflict. [17]Despite the deteriorating relationship between Arab’s and Israeli’s throughoutthe 1990s, the RWG was the only working group that continued to meet. Thisspeaks volumes to the Canadian reputation, and provides a segue into how thisserved the national interest.  The RWG shows howCanada used active relations as an approach to peacemaking efforts, whichserves the national interest by providing some sense of stability to theregion. Moreover, by organizing the RWG, Canada was looked upon favourably bymany facets of the international community. To restate, Canada’s reputation asa diplomatically balanced country with strong negotiation skills, allowed forit to have more influence in the international sphere than it otherwise wouldhave. The active relations approach also pleased both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestiniangroups within Canada. Most importantly to the Canadian national interest, theUnited States viewed Canada’s handling of the RWG as a doing them a favour.[18]Much like how joining UNSCOP appeased Great Britain because it relieved them ofsome responsibilities, handling the RWG allowed the United States to focus onother aspects of the conflict. 2004 – 2015With the electionof Paul Martin as PM, this marked the end of Canada’s balanced approach towardsthe conflict. In the words of foreign affairs minister John Baird, “there is nobetter friend to Israel than Canada.”[19] Iargue that the change in approach towards becoming an unconditional supporterof Israel disrupted the pursuit of national interests. We look at how thischange in approach was detrimental to Canada’s national interests in moredetail later. For now, let us examine how and why this change in approachoccurred. As mentioned, the shift began when Prime Minister Paul Martin becamePM, and he appointed his cabinet ministers. Six members of a group called “Liberalsfor Israel” became Federal Cabinet ministers in 2004. Their greatest impact wason Canada’s UN voting patterns towards the conflict. Canada would now consistentlycriticize Palestine, while abstaining from votes that condemned Israeliactions. This is unlike the previous time period whereby Canada would vote on acase-by-case basis. [20]This norm defying behaviour continued to intensify under Stephen Harper’s timeas Prime Minister. In 2006, the balance in foreign aid shifted drastically. Canada wasthe first country to cut off aid to the Palestinians after Hamas came to powerin the Gaza Strip in 2006.[21]Unlike previously, where both Israel and the PLO’s were considered equalentities, Harper became Israel’s most supportive and unconditional ally. Withthat, Canada lost the United Nation’s trust in being an effective negotiator,which had become a part of the Canadian identity. This was acceptable to Harperas he wished to be less involved with the UN.As for the effect this had on Canada, mainly it lessened their influencein the international sphere. With this new one-sided approach, Canada lost theability to be an effective participant in the peace process, much less awelcomed one. This likely played a part in Canada losing their bid for anon-permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Lastly, Canada did not receivethe UN voting support that it had received from Arab countries in the past,effectively ending Canada’s above average influence within the UN. So why changean approach that was beneficial for Canada?The probable reasoning behind the change is twofold. It likely comesdown to personal ideology and domestic politics. Harper believed Canada’sforeign policy should be based on his morals rather than neutrality. In a 2003speech, he stated, “We need to rediscover Burkean conservatism because theemerging debates on foreign affairs should be fought on moral grounds.”[22] Perhaps this was personal policymaking; however, there is also theargument that the shift displays efforts to win the Jewish Canadian vote. Showingsupport for Israel was a particularly important issue whereby Harper could winover much of the previously Liberal voting Jewish Canadians without changinglaws such as gay marriage or abortion. While Canada has a substantial Arabpopulation as well, they do not have as many powerful interest groups and areless organized by comparison.[23] Thedomestic benefits Harper and Martin received, in their minds, outweigh thebenefits Canada had received internationally for numerous years.Current State of AffairsThere is a lack of scholarly publication regarding the current Liberalgovernments approach towards the Arab – Israeli conflict. Thus, this paper doesnot aim to illustrate their position; rather, I wish to conclude by offeringthe reader how I think the government should approach the conflict given thecurrent state of affairs. Let us begin with a brief examination of the conflict.Per the United States Institute of Peace, tensions have increasedmarkedly between Israeli and Palestinian societies since the collapse ofanother round of peace negotiations in 2014. Violent incidents have sparkedretaliatory attacks in both directions, including over access to the Jerusalemreligious site known as the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif. Notably, Palestineremains divided both politically and territorially. With the Hamas regimecontrolling the Gaza Strip and Fatah controlling the West Bank, the risk ofmore widespread and sustained violent conflict looms. Israel on the other hand,continues to build what are considered illegal settlements according tointernational law, expanding both their hard and soft power. These politicaland social dynamics in both societies make orchestrating effective negotiationsa challenge. So where should Canada position itself?Based on the brief historical analysis of the Canadian experience withinthe conflict, I believe realism should be Canada’s approach. To reinstaterealism, one has to understand what is in the best interest of Canada. In myinterpretation, I think Canada should revert to the “active relations” form ofbalance. Let us look at the pros and cons. During the 1968 – 2004 section, Canada benefitted from increasedreputability on the international sphere. Due to their neutrality on theArab-Palestine conflict, Canada received favourable voting patterns from theArab states, as well as support from Israel during other UN votes. This allowsCanada to punch above its weight in terms of international influence based onits reputation as an honest country.[24] More so than ever, Canadaneeds the support of OPEC. With the oil prices being as volatile as they are,Canada’s economy which is heavily reliant on consistent oil exports is leftvulnerable. Active relations may help regain the support of Arab countries forboth oil related and other international interests.  Secondly, Canada should consider taking over peace efforts to pleasethe United States, Canada’s most important alliance. In alleviating thepressure put on the Americans to lead mediation, this may lead to more prosperoustrade relations, which in turn benefit Canada’s economy. Leading any peaceefforts is currently impossible, especially given Canada’s status as Israel’s bestfriend. Palestine would likely perceive Canada as a biased third party duringany form of negotiations. Since the current regimes are unwilling to negotiate,this allows Canada ample time to resituate itself as an effective and willingbroker of peace. The cons of this plan are that it will be difficult to reduce aid toIsrael without causing turmoil. Some would argue that this would irritate theUnited States; however, I believe my previous argument would outweigh anynegative sentiments felt by the US. In my view, reducing aid must be donebecause aid tends to maintain the status quo,[25] and currently, Israel is asuncompromising as ever. Losing Israel’s support, hopefully just temporarily, isa small price to pay to regain positive international recognition. ConclusionHopefully this paper has given the reader insight as to how Canada hasapproached the Arab – Israeli conflict throughout history. From being reluctantto take a position; to a balanced approach; to being an unconditional ally ofIsrael; Canada’s foreign policy has undoubtedly evolved. Along with the changein position comes ramifications for Canada’s national interests. The mostnotable shift in my view is the shift from realism to moral based foreignpolicy making. Based on Canada’s history of pursuing their national interestsin foreign affairs, it is clear to me that Martin-Harper policies were imposedfor personal, rather than Canadian gain. But what good is keeping your job, ifit is to Canada’s disadvantage? In short, I think that if Canada wants to workthis conflict to their advantage, and to contribute positively to global peace,it must recapture its sense of balance. ReferencesBercuson, David. 1985. Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Brynen, Rex. 2007. Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.Cavell, Janice. 2007. “Suez and After: Canada and British Policy in the Middle East, 1956-1960.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 157-177.Donald, Barry. 2010. “Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy.” Arab Studies Quarterly 191-217.Flicker, Charles. 2003. “Next Year in Jerusalem: Joe Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair.” International Journal 115-138.Government of Canada. n.d. “National Archives of Canada.” Department of External Affairs Records. Heinbecker, Paul. 2007. Canada and the Middle East: Ambivalence or Engagement. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.Hibbard, Steve. 2012. “Canada’s Middle East Policy: The End of Fair-Minded Idealism or a New Beginning?” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East 1-13.Holmes, John. 1982. The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 – 1957. Toronto: Toronto University Press.Jacoby, Tami, and Brett Sasley. 2007. Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press.Kay, Zachariah. 2010. The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel 1958-1968. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.Kennedy, Mark. 2014. “The Harper Doctrine: Why Canada’s Prime Minister Supports Israel.” Ottawa Citizen, August 3.League of Arab States. 1967. “Khartoum Resolution.” Council on Foreign Policy Relations. September 1.Mackenzie, Hector. 2016. “Antony Anderson, The DiplomatL Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis.” British Journal of Canadian Studies 273-296.Mallakh, Ragaei El. 1982. OPEC: Twenty Years and Beyond. London: Westview Press.Miller, Ronnie. 1991. From Lebanon to the Intifada: The Jewish Lobby and Canadian Middle East. Maryland: University Press of America.Morgenthau, Hans. 1978. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.Peters, Joel. 1996. Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.QMI Agency. 2012. “Canada is Israel’s Best Friend: Baird.” Toronto Sun, May 5.Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 2006. “Canada at the United Nations 1945-1989.” International Journal 145–160.Robinson, Andrew. 2011. “Canada’s credibility as an actor in the Middle East peace process.” International Journal 698-715.Robinson, Andrew. 2011. “Canada’s Credibility as an Actor in the Middle East Peace Process: The Refugee Working Group, 1992-2000.” International Journal 695-718.Robinson, Bill, and Peter Ibbott. 2003. Canadian military spending: How does the current level compare to historical levels? to allied spending? to potential threats? Working Paper, London: Project Ploughshares.Robinson, Jacob. 1971. Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude to Solution. Washington: Westport.Tauber, Eliezer. 2002. Personal Policy Making: Canada’s Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution. Greenwood: Westport.[1] Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle forPower and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)[2] John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Searchfor World Order, 1943 – 1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)[3] John Holmes, TheShaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943 – 1957, (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1982)[4] Eliezer Tauber, Personal Policy Making: Canada’s Role in theAdoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution, (Greenwood: Westport, 2002)[5] Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude toSolution, (Washington: Westport, 1971)[6] Bill Robinson and PeterIbbott, “Canadian military spending: How does the current level compare tohistorical levels? to allied spending? to potential threats?” Project Ploughshares (2003): 9.[7] David Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study inCanadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press, 1985)[8] Hector Mackenzie, “AntonyAnderson, The Diplomat: Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis,” British Journal of Canadian studies(2016): 275.[9] Zachariah Kay, The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada andIsrael 1958-1968, (Waterloo: WilfridLaurierUniversity Press, 2010)[10] National Archives ofCanada (NAC), Department of External Affairs Records.[11] League of Arab States, “KhartoumResolution,” Council on Foreign Policy Relations (1 September 1967)[12] Ronnie Miller, From Lebanon to the Intifada: The JewishLobby and Canadian Middle EastPolicy, (Maryland: UniversityPress of America, 1991)[13] Ronnie Miller, From Lebanon to the Intifada: The JewishLobby and Canadian Middle EastPolicy (Maryland: UniversityPress of America, 1991)[14] Steve Hibbard, “Canada’sMiddle East Policy: The End of Fair-Minded Idealism or a NewBeginning?”Canadians for Justice and Peace in theMiddle East (2012).[15] Treaty E105063, lastmodified 3 March 2014, accessed 9 December 2016,http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105063 [16] Rex Brynen, “Canada’sRole in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” In Canada and the Middle East:In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007[17] Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace: The MultilateralArab-Israeli Peace Talks, (London: Royal InstituteofInternational Affairs, 1996) [18] Andrew Robinson. “Canada’scredibility as an actor in the Middle East peace process: Therefugeeworking group, 1992 – 2000.” InternationalJournal (2011): 702[19] “Canada is Israel’sBest Friend: Baird,” Toronto Sun,last modified 5 May 2012, accessed 10 December 2016,http://www.torontosun.com/2012/05/05/canada-is-israels-best-friend-baird[20] Donald Barry, “Canadaand the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy.” Arab Studies Quarterly (2010): 200[21] Paul Heinbecker, “Canadaand the Middle East: Ambivalence or Engagement,” In Canada and the Middle East:In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007[22] Mark Kennedy, “TheHarper Doctrine: Why Canada’s Prime Minister Supports Israel.” The OttawaCitizen 3 Aug. 2014, Politics sec. Web.http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/theharper-doctrine-why-canadas-prime-minister-supports-israel[23] Brett Sasley and TamiAmanda Jacoby, “Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian ForeignPolicy.” In Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice edited by PaulHeinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007[24] Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Canada at the United Nations 1945-1989,” International Journal (SagePublications, 2006): 146[25] Rex Brynen, “Canada’sRole in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.” In Canada and the Middle East:In Theory and Practice edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, Waterloo:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more