To what extent do states have the right to exclude foreigners from settling within their borders?This question is concerned with the relationship between states and their members. In debates on immigration, there are usually two positions. One view is the movement of people between states should be completely free thus borders should be open. The other view is that states have a right to exclude foreigners from settling within their borders. On the face of it, the right to exclude looks morally contestable as it involves substantial state force. For instance, criminalising individuals for unauthorised border crossings and it involves forcibly preventing people from getting things that they might desperately need like a better life for them and their family. As these factors are usually considered to be morally wrong, then can such a right to exclude be morally justified. Within this essay, I will exhibit both positions from the perspectives of Joseph Carens and David Miller. I will argue that states do not have a right to exclude. Firstly,I will demonstrate the argument from Joseph Carens for open borders thus disagreeingwith the statement that states have a right to exclude. Advocates for openborders are not arguing for wholly elimination of borders but rather forchanges in how those affected might move across them and in how they areunderstood. Carens claims that there is no right for states to unilaterallycontrol their own borders as he believes that “borders should generally be openand people should normally be free to leave their country of origin and settlein another” (Carens, 2013,225) He contends that states’ rights to excludeoutsiders from settling in their borders are incompatible with our basic valuesand commitments. One being freedom. Immigration restrictions are a seriousinfringement on freedom, especially on freedom of movement. This freedom bothgood in itself as it is an expression of autonomy and it is also instrumentallyvaluable as it enables individuals to improve their prospects if they have theability to move to a more advantageous location. The other being fundamentalmoral equality. Immigration restrictions enforce huge inequalities ofopportunity. Freedom of movement is essential for equality of opportunity andthis explains our intuition about the wrongness of feudalism. Carens providesan analogy where he compares contemporary states’ practice of border control tomedieval feudal societies. He is claiming that being born in a rich state forexample, Europe and North America is like being born into medieval nobility andto be born in a poor country is like being born into peasantry. This isapplicable to now with the deductions that your place of birth determines yourinitial prospects and that states prevent you from trying to improve yoursituation by moving to another country. The “modern practice of state controlover borders tie people to the land of their birth almost as effectively (asfeudal practice)” (Carens,2013,226) Carens believes that since we endorsefreedom of movement with society, we should endorse it with respect tooutsiders too. Following this, freedom of international movement should beconsidered as a basic human right. Caren’s also provides another argument whichis the idea that if you are committed to uncontroversial human rights youshould be committed to there being a human right to cross borders. For instance,an uncontroversial right would be the right to freedom of movement within one’sown country. As Carens puts it “if it is so important for people to have theright to move freely within a state. Isn’t it equally important for them tohave the right to move across state borders” also “every reason why one mightwant to move within a state may also be a reason for moving between states”(Carens,2013,239) for example love, job, religion, cultural opportunities. Thisis stating that every reason in which an individual might have for movingwithin a country can also be applicable to move across state borders. Although Carensdoes believe that these arguments provide a strong case for states to have openborders, nonetheless he does acknowledge that some immigration restrictions canbe justified. He claims that we cannot justify them by appealing to a state’sright to decide but there could be other justifications that appeal to otherconsiderations that are compatible with viewing all individuals as having equalmoral worth. For instance, extreme overcrowding or serious security threats. Fromthis I will now look at the perspective that states do have a right to exclude.Incontrast, David Miller objects to Carens position. He argues from a restrictiveperspective and contends that states do have a right to exclude. Miller’s mainclaim is that there could be ‘cases in which nation states could be justifiedin imposing restrictive immigration policies’ (Miller,2014,363) Miller providesobjections to Caren’s argument for the case of open borders. One is on theargument from a human right to internal freedom of movement. He questionsactually how much movement is required by this right “What is less clear…is the physical extent of the right, inthe sense of how much of the earth’s surface I must be able to move to in orderto say that I enjoy it” (Miller,2014,365) He argues that Carens is not clearabout the physical extent of the right for instance how much of the earth’ssurface can we move in order to enjoy the right? Miller points out that theinternal right to movement is actually subject to lots of restrictions that seemacceptable for example parking regulations, private property etc. His view isthat the right to movement protects an adequate range of options not a maximalrange of options. He provides a distinction between basic freedoms and barefreedoms. Basic freedoms are those necessary for a minimally decent life andbare freedoms are those not necessarily for a minimally decent life. Carens suggeststhat the right to freedom of movement is a basic freedom. Whereas Miller countersthis to argue that as long as your state gives you an adequate range of freemovement, your human right is satisfied and you do not have a general claim toimmigrate to another state of your choice thus a bare freedom. Miller alsoprovides a positive case for the right to exclude. According to Miller’s view,individuals don’t have a general right to immigrate. One reason for this is topreserve culture. He believes that states have a legitimate interest inpreserving the political culture and or controlling how that culture changesover time for instance the role of language in maintaining a public culture forexample if a lot of English people move to Thailand how would that affect thenative language. Another reason is that the role of immigration restrictionsplays an important role in curbing the population growth both globally andnationally as immigration can cause all sorts of problems. For instance, thenatural environment can be jeopardised by overcrowding, also increase inclimate change and resource consumption. On the other hand, what about cases ofrefugees fleeing persecution or starvation? Miller is targeting general claimsabout right to immigrate, he does acknowledge that there are more extreme casesof immigration. He contends that they do potentially have a right to enteranother state due to their basic freedoms and interests are not being met bytheir state. However, this is not a general right to immigrate to any state ofyour choice, you only a right that some state let you enter rather it is aremedial right. It only exists if people are acting wrongly so for Miller, in ajust world people would not have it. However, what about people who don’t evenhave the minimum, do they not have the right to immigrate? Miller would respondto this by agreeing they do have a right but it depends. Wealthy states areeither obliged to either allow such persons to immigrate or aid them in theirhome country. Millers argues that it is more preferable to aid people in theirhome country. As immigration is unlikely to help the very worst off due to themnot being able to afford to move and it might actually harm them. This is whathe calls the brain drain problem which is where people with desired skills setsin a less well-off country getting paid more in the new country they immigratedto but leaving people behind who don’t have the skills left so are deprived. Inconclusion, I have exhibited two perspectives to the question as to whetherstates have the right to exclude foreigners from settling within their borders.Joseph Carens who argues that states do not have a right exclude and insteadargues for open borders. In contrast David Miller argues from a restrictiveperspective arguing that to a certain extent they do have a right to exclude. Followingthis, I have come to the conclusion that states do not have a right to excludethus agreeing with Caren’s perspective that immigration restrictions infringeour human right of freedom. Bibliography:CarensJ (2013) ‘The Ethics of Immigration’ Chapter11 – The case for open borders pgs 225-239MillerD (2014) ‘Immigration:The Case for Limits’ in Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman(eds.), Contemporary Debates in AppliedEthics, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, (2nd ed.), pp. 363-376Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more